The Politics of Judicial Independence:
Exploring Supreme Court Decisions in Uruguay (1989-2018)
Keywords:
judicial politics, Uruguay Supreme Court, unconstitutionality, attitudinal modelAbstract
What is the role of the Judiciary in Uruguayan politics? Like most Latin American countries, social science research among domestic scholars has been mainly focused on political institutions and public policies. Yet, recent political developments have challenged this focus, as judicial institutions have become more salient in the political process, either reinforcing or reverting important policy decisions of governments. While some pundits have argued that the judiciary has become more politicized, others have argued for a judicialization of politics. Nevertheless, there is no evidence revealing the political nature of judicial decisions made in Uruguay. This paper studies the Uruguayan Supreme Court divided decisions between 1989 and 2018, by exploring the individual decisions made by judges on every unconstitutional demand made by citizens and a wide variety of civil society organizations and pressure groups. The research extends the W-nominate technique, developed for the study of legislative bodies, to the votes made by individual judges, showing an ideological profile of voting patterns during the period under study.
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References
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ANTÍA, F., y VAIRO, D. (2019b). Política y justicia en Uruguay: el poder de la Suprema Corte de Justicia (1990-2018). Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 28(2), 61-86.
BAFUMI, J., GELMAN, A., PARK, D. K., y KAPLAN N. (2005). Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation. Political Analysis, 13(2), 171-87.
BASABE-SERRANO, S. (2014). Determinants of Judicial Dissent in Contexts of Extreme Institutional Instability: The Case of Ecuador’s Constitutional Court. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6(1), 83-107.
BAUM, L. (1997). The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior. Ann Arbor, EE. UU.: University of Michigan Press.
BAUM, L. (2006). Judges and their audiences: a perspective on judicial behavior. Princeton: EE. UU.: Princeton University Press
BLACK, D. (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
BRINKS, D. (2012). ‘A Tale of Two Cities’: The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Latin America. En P. Kingstone, y D. J. Yashar (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Routledge.
CARROL, R, y TIEDE, L. (2012). Ideological Voting on Chile’s Constitutional Tribunal: Dissent Coalitions in the Adjudication of Rights. Journal of Human Rights, 11(1), 85-105.
CASTRO RIVERA, A. (2009). Una sentencia que no pudo clausurar el debate. Revista de Derecho Público, 35, 125-154.
DESPOSATO, S., INGRAM, M. C.; LANNES O. P. Jr. (2014). Power, Composition, and Decision Making: The Behavioral Consequences of Institutional Reform on Brazil’s Supremo Tribunal Federal. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 31(3), 534-556.
DOMINGO, P. (2004). Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary? Recent trends in Latin America. Democratization, 11(4), 104-126.
DOWNS, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Harper & Row.
EPSTEIN, L., y SEGAL, J. A. (2005). Advice and consent: the politics of judicial appointments. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Oxford University Press.
EPSTEIN, L (2016). Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior. William & Mary Law Review, 57(6), 2017-2073.
GALAIN, P. (2011). La justicia de transición en Uruguay: Un conflicto sin resolución. Revista de Derecho, 6, 109-153.
GAROUPA, N., y GINSBURG T. (2009). Reputation, Information, and the Organization of the Judiciary. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper n.º. 503.
GONZÁLEZ BARTOLOMEU, J., DALLA PELLEGRINA, L., GAROUPA, N. (2017). Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina. Review of Law & Economics, 13(1), 1-35.
HARNAY, S., y MARCIANO, A. (2003). Judicial conformity versus dissidence: An economic analysis of judicial precedent. International Review of Law and Economics, 23, 405-420.
HELMKE, G. (2005). Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
HELMKE, G., y RÍOS FIGUEROA, J. (Eds.). (2011). Courts in Latin America. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
HINICH, M., y MUNGER, M. C. (1994). Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: EE. UU.: University of Michigan Press.
KAPISZEWSKI, D., y TAYLOR, M. (2008). Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America. Perspectives on Politics, 6(4), 741-767.
PARDOW LORENZO, D., y CARBONELL BELLOLIO, F. (2018). Buscando al ‘juez mediano’: estudio sobre la formación de coaliciones en la tercera sala de la Corte Suprema. Revista Ciencia Política, 38(3), 485-505.
POOLE, K., LEWIS, J., LO, J., y CARROLL, R. (2011). Scaling Roll Call Votes with {wnominate} in {R}. Journal of Statistical Software, 42(14), 1-21.
POSNER, R. (1993). What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does). Supreme Court Economics Review, 30, 1-41.
RISSO FERRAND, M. (2014). El ‘juez constitucional’ en el Uruguay. Revista de Derecho Público, 23(45), 79-102.
SÁNCHEZ, A., MAGALONI, B., y MAGAR, E. (2011). Legalist vs. Interpretativist: The Supreme Court and the Democratic Transition in Mexico. En G. Helmke, y J. Ríos Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 187-218). Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
SEGAL, J., y COVER, A. D. (1989). Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme U.S. Supreme Court Justices. American Political Science Review, 83(2), 557-565.
SEGAL, J. A., EPSTEIN, L., CAMERON, C. M., y SPAETH, H. J. (1995). Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited. Journal of Politics, 57(08), 812-23.
SEGAL, J. A., y SPAETH, H. J. (2002). The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
SEGAL, J. A., y CHAMPLIN, A. J. (2017). The Attitudinal Model. En R. M. Howard, y K. Randazzo (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Judicial Behavior. doi: 10.4324/9781315691527.
SILVA, J. M. (2018). Mapeando o Supremo: as posições dos ministros do STF na jurisdição constitucional. Novos Estudos CEBRAP, 37(1), 35-54.
TRUJILLO, H. (2013). Conflictos políticos y Poder Judicial (1985-2006). Montevideo, Uruguay: Universidad de la República.
VÉSCOVI, E. (1967). El proceso de inconstitucionalidad de la ley. Montevideo, Uruguay: Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales.
ANTÍA, F., y VAIRO, D. (2019b). Política y justicia en Uruguay: el poder de la Suprema Corte de Justicia (1990-2018). Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 28(2), 61-86.
BAFUMI, J., GELMAN, A., PARK, D. K., y KAPLAN N. (2005). Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation. Political Analysis, 13(2), 171-87.
BASABE-SERRANO, S. (2014). Determinants of Judicial Dissent in Contexts of Extreme Institutional Instability: The Case of Ecuador’s Constitutional Court. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6(1), 83-107.
BAUM, L. (1997). The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior. Ann Arbor, EE. UU.: University of Michigan Press.
BAUM, L. (2006). Judges and their audiences: a perspective on judicial behavior. Princeton: EE. UU.: Princeton University Press
BLACK, D. (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
BRINKS, D. (2012). ‘A Tale of Two Cities’: The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Latin America. En P. Kingstone, y D. J. Yashar (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Routledge.
CARROL, R, y TIEDE, L. (2012). Ideological Voting on Chile’s Constitutional Tribunal: Dissent Coalitions in the Adjudication of Rights. Journal of Human Rights, 11(1), 85-105.
CASTRO RIVERA, A. (2009). Una sentencia que no pudo clausurar el debate. Revista de Derecho Público, 35, 125-154.
DESPOSATO, S., INGRAM, M. C.; LANNES O. P. Jr. (2014). Power, Composition, and Decision Making: The Behavioral Consequences of Institutional Reform on Brazil’s Supremo Tribunal Federal. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 31(3), 534-556.
DOMINGO, P. (2004). Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary? Recent trends in Latin America. Democratization, 11(4), 104-126.
DOWNS, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Harper & Row.
EPSTEIN, L., y SEGAL, J. A. (2005). Advice and consent: the politics of judicial appointments. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Oxford University Press.
EPSTEIN, L (2016). Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior. William & Mary Law Review, 57(6), 2017-2073.
GALAIN, P. (2011). La justicia de transición en Uruguay: Un conflicto sin resolución. Revista de Derecho, 6, 109-153.
GAROUPA, N., y GINSBURG T. (2009). Reputation, Information, and the Organization of the Judiciary. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper n.º. 503.
GONZÁLEZ BARTOLOMEU, J., DALLA PELLEGRINA, L., GAROUPA, N. (2017). Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina. Review of Law & Economics, 13(1), 1-35.
HARNAY, S., y MARCIANO, A. (2003). Judicial conformity versus dissidence: An economic analysis of judicial precedent. International Review of Law and Economics, 23, 405-420.
HELMKE, G. (2005). Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
HELMKE, G., y RÍOS FIGUEROA, J. (Eds.). (2011). Courts in Latin America. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
HINICH, M., y MUNGER, M. C. (1994). Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: EE. UU.: University of Michigan Press.
KAPISZEWSKI, D., y TAYLOR, M. (2008). Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America. Perspectives on Politics, 6(4), 741-767.
PARDOW LORENZO, D., y CARBONELL BELLOLIO, F. (2018). Buscando al ‘juez mediano’: estudio sobre la formación de coaliciones en la tercera sala de la Corte Suprema. Revista Ciencia Política, 38(3), 485-505.
POOLE, K., LEWIS, J., LO, J., y CARROLL, R. (2011). Scaling Roll Call Votes with {wnominate} in {R}. Journal of Statistical Software, 42(14), 1-21.
POSNER, R. (1993). What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does). Supreme Court Economics Review, 30, 1-41.
RISSO FERRAND, M. (2014). El ‘juez constitucional’ en el Uruguay. Revista de Derecho Público, 23(45), 79-102.
SÁNCHEZ, A., MAGALONI, B., y MAGAR, E. (2011). Legalist vs. Interpretativist: The Supreme Court and the Democratic Transition in Mexico. En G. Helmke, y J. Ríos Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 187-218). Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
SEGAL, J., y COVER, A. D. (1989). Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme U.S. Supreme Court Justices. American Political Science Review, 83(2), 557-565.
SEGAL, J. A., EPSTEIN, L., CAMERON, C. M., y SPAETH, H. J. (1995). Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited. Journal of Politics, 57(08), 812-23.
SEGAL, J. A., y SPAETH, H. J. (2002). The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
SEGAL, J. A., y CHAMPLIN, A. J. (2017). The Attitudinal Model. En R. M. Howard, y K. Randazzo (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Judicial Behavior. doi: 10.4324/9781315691527.
SILVA, J. M. (2018). Mapeando o Supremo: as posições dos ministros do STF na jurisdição constitucional. Novos Estudos CEBRAP, 37(1), 35-54.
TRUJILLO, H. (2013). Conflictos políticos y Poder Judicial (1985-2006). Montevideo, Uruguay: Universidad de la República.
VÉSCOVI, E. (1967). El proceso de inconstitucionalidad de la ley. Montevideo, Uruguay: Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales.
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Published
2020-06-02
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Section
Articles
How to Cite
The Politics of Judicial Independence:: Exploring Supreme Court Decisions in Uruguay (1989-2018). (2020). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 29(1), 135-156. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/462
