La organización de las legislaturas democráticas
Palabras clave:
organización, legislaturas democráticas, asambleas democráticasResumen
¿Por qué las legislaturas están organizadas tal como las conocemos? Si dispusiéramos de una máquina del tiempo para viajar por la historia de las asambleas democráticas más duraderas, nos encontraríamos con que las reglas son cada vez más exiguas y simples a medida que retrocedemos en el tiempo. Extrapolando esas tendencias podríamos arribar a lo que aquí llamo el estado de naturaleza legislativo –esto es, una asamblea en la que todos los asuntos se deciden en sesiones plenarias (sin comisiones) y en la que no existen restricciones ni regulaciones que limiten el derecho de sus miembros a tomar la palabra o a presentar mociones. En este artículo sostengo que ciertas características universales de las asambleas democráticas modernas –como los partidos y los cargos especializados en la introducción de asuntos en la agenda- surgieron como una respuesta a la escasez de tiempo de las sesiones plenarias en el estado de naturaleza legislativo (...)
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Referencias
Aldrich, J. H.(1995).Why Parties?Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Aldrich, J. H. yRohde, D. W.(2000). The consequences of party organization in the House: the roleof the majority and minority parties in conditional party government. EnJ.Bond and R.Fleisher (Eds.),Polarized Politics:Congress and the President in a Partisan Era(pp. 31-72). Washington, DC:CQ Press.
Alt, J., yLowry, R.(1994). Divided government, fiscal institutions and budget deficits:evidence from the states.American Political Science Review, 88(4): 811-28.
Amorim Neto, O., Cox, G. W., yMcCubbins, M.(2003). Agenda Power in Brazil’s Câmarados Deputados, 1989 to 1998.World Politics,55(4): 550-78.
Andrews, J.(2002).When Majorities Fail: The Russian Legislature, 1990-1993. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Baron, D.(1998). Comparative dynamics of parliamentary governments.American PoliticalScience Review, 92(3): 593-603.
Baron, D.yFerejohn, J.(1989). Bargaining in legislatures.American Political Science, Review,83(4): 1181-206.
Bawn, K., yRosenbluth, F.(2004). Short versus long coalitions: how electoral agency shapesthe political logic of costs and benefits. Manuscrito inédito, UCLAyYale.
Binder, S. A.(1997).Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J.M., yTullock, G.(1962).The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations ofConstitutional Democracy .Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Campbell, A., Cox, G. W., yMcCubbins, M. D.(2002). Agenda power in the Senate, 1877to1986.EnD. W.Brady and M. D.McCubbins (Eds.),Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the Historyof Congress(pp. 218-247). Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford UniversityPress.
Carey, J., yShugart, M. (Eds.)(1998).Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carroll, R., Cox, G. W., yPachón, M.(2004a). How parties create electoral democracy,chapter 2. Ponencia presentadaen la reunión de laAmerican Political ScienceAssociation, Chicago, 1-4, Sept. 2004.
Carroll, R., Cox, G. W., y Pachón, M.(2004b). Shadowing ministers. Manuscrito inédito, University of California, San Diego.
Cook, T. E.(1989).Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Cox, G. W.(1987).The Efficient Secret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G. W.(1993). The development of collective responsibility in the United Kingdom.Parliamentary History,13(1): 32-47.
Cox, G. W.(2001). The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes. EnM.D.McCubbinsyS.Haggard (Eds.) Presidents, Parliaments and Policy(pp. 21-63). New York:Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G. W.(2002). Agenda power in the House of Representatives. En D. W.BradyyM. D.McCubbins (Eds.),Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress ed(pp.107-145). Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Cox, G. W.(2005). Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G. W. y McCubbins M. D. (1993).Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Cox, G. W. Masuyama, M. , yMcCubbins, M. D.(2000). Agenda power in the Japanese House ofRepresentatives.Japanese Journal of Political Science,1(1): 1-22.
Damgaard, E., ySvenson, P.(1989). Who governs? Parties and policies in Denmark.European Journal of Political Research, 17(6): 731-45.
Diermeier, D., yFeddersen, T.(1998). Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidenceprocedure.American Political Science Review, 92(3): 611-22.
Dion, D.(1997).Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change inLegislative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Dion, D.yHuber, J.(1996). Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules.The Journalof Politics, 58(1): 25-53.
Döring, H.(1995). Time as a scarce resource: government control of the agenda. EnH.Döring(Ed.),Parliamentsand Majority Rule in Western Europe(pp. 223-247). Frankfurt:Campus Verlag.
Evans, C. L.(2001). Committees, leaders and message politics. EnDodd yB.Oppenheimer (Eds.),Congress Reconsidered (7ma.edición). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Figueiredo, A. C., yLimongi, F.(1999).Executivo e legislativo na nova ordem constitucional.Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV.
Gilligan, T., yKrehbiel, K.(1990). Organization of informative committees by a rationalLegislature.American Journal of Political Science, 34(2): 531-64.
Green, A.(1979).Devolution and Public Finance: Stormont from 1921 to 1972. Glasgow: Centrefor the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.
Groseclose, T., and McCarty, N.(2000). The politics of blame: bargaining before an audience. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1): 100-19.
Hagevi, M.(2000). Nordic light on committee assignments. En P.EsaiassonyK.Heidar(Eds.)Beyond Westminster andCongress: The Nordic Experience(pp.237-264). Columbus: Ohio StateUniversity Press.
Heller, W. B.(1997). Bicameralism and budget deficits: the effect of parliamentary structure ongovernment spending.Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(4): 485-516.
Heller, W. B.(2001). Making policy stick: why the government gets what it wants in multiparty parliaments.American Journal of Political Science, 45(4): 780-98.
Henning, C.H. C.A.(1995). A formal model of law production by government as a naturalMonopoly. EnH.Döring (Ed.),Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe(pp. 601-614). Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
Huber, J.(1996).Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huber, J.yShipan, C.(2002).Deliberate Discretion?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inman, R., eIngberman, D.(1988). The political economy of fiscal policy.EnP. G.Hare (Ed.),Public Economics: A Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Jones, C.(1970).The Minority Party in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.
Krehbiel, K. (1991).Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Krehbiel, K.yMeirowitz, A.(2002). Power and the motion to recommit.Legislative Studies Quarterly,27(29): 191-218.
Laver, M., yShepsle, K.(1996).Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislaturesin Parliamentary Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Londregan, J.(2000).Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McKelvey, R.(1976). Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implicationsfor agenda control.Journal of Economic Theory, 12(3): 472-82.
Maltzman, F., ySigelman, L.(1996). The politics of talk: unconstrained floor time in theU.S. House of Representatives.Journal of Politics, 58(4): 819-30.
Martin, L. W., yVanberg, G.2004. Policing the bargain: coalition government andparliamentary scrutiny.American Journal of Political Science, 48(1): 13-27.
Muthoo, A., yShepsle, K.A.(2004). Agenda-setting power in organizations with overlapping generations of players. Manuscrito inédito, Harvard University.
Persson, T., Roland, G., yTabellini, G.(2003). How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? Manuscrito inédito.
Poterba, J., yvon Hagen, J. (Eds.). (1999).Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance. Chicago:Chicago University Press.
Rasch, B. E.(2000). “Parliamentary floor voting procedures and agenda setting in Europe”. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25(1): 3-23.
Remington, T. F.(1998). Political conflict and institutional design: paths of party development in Russia. En J.Lowenhardt (Ed.),Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia(pp. 201-223).Londres:Frank Cass.
Remington, T. F.ySmith, S.S.(1995). The development of parliamentary parties inRussia.Legislative Studies Quarterly,20(4): 457-89.
Romer, T., and Rosenthal, H.(1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and thestatus quo.Public Choice, 33(4): 27-44.
Romer, T., and Rosenthal, H.(1979). Bureaucrats versus voters: on the political economy of resource allocation bydirect democracy.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4): 563-87.
Schofield, N.(1978). Intransitivities of simple dynamic games.Review of Economic Studies,45: 575-94.
Shaw, M.(1979). Conclusions. En J. D.Lees and M.Shaw (Eds.),Committees in Legislatures. Oxford:Martin Robertson.
Siavelis, P.(2002). Exaggerated presidentialism and moderate presidents: executive-legislativerelations in Chile. En S.MorgensternyB.Nacif (Eds.),Legislative Politics in Latin America(pp. 79-113). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Somogyvári, I.(1994). Legal institutions in standing orders of the parliaments of advanceddemocracies. En A.Ágh (Ed.),The Emergence of East Central European Parliaments. Budapest:Hungarian Centre of Democracy Studies.
Thies, M.(2001). Keeping tabs on one’s partners: the logic of delegation in coalition governments.American Journal of Political Science,45(3): 580-98.
Thompson, J. A.(1986). Bringing home the bacon: the politics of pork barrel in the North Carolina legislature.Legislative Studies Quarterly, 11(1): 91-108.
Tsebelis, G.(1995). Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies. En H.Döring (Ed.) Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe(pp. 83-113). New York: St Martin’s Press.
Tsebelis, G.(2002).Veto Players. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tsebelis, G.yMoney, J.(1997).Bicameralism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weingast, B.(1992). Fighting fire with fire: amending activity and institutional change inthe post-reform Congress. En R. H.Davidson (Ed.),The Postreform Congress. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Weingast, G.yMarshall, W.(1988). The industrial organization of Congress.Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 96(1): 132-63.
Wittman, D.(1995).The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Aldrich, J. H. yRohde, D. W.(2000). The consequences of party organization in the House: the roleof the majority and minority parties in conditional party government. EnJ.Bond and R.Fleisher (Eds.),Polarized Politics:Congress and the President in a Partisan Era(pp. 31-72). Washington, DC:CQ Press.
Alt, J., yLowry, R.(1994). Divided government, fiscal institutions and budget deficits:evidence from the states.American Political Science Review, 88(4): 811-28.
Amorim Neto, O., Cox, G. W., yMcCubbins, M.(2003). Agenda Power in Brazil’s Câmarados Deputados, 1989 to 1998.World Politics,55(4): 550-78.
Andrews, J.(2002).When Majorities Fail: The Russian Legislature, 1990-1993. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Baron, D.(1998). Comparative dynamics of parliamentary governments.American PoliticalScience Review, 92(3): 593-603.
Baron, D.yFerejohn, J.(1989). Bargaining in legislatures.American Political Science, Review,83(4): 1181-206.
Bawn, K., yRosenbluth, F.(2004). Short versus long coalitions: how electoral agency shapesthe political logic of costs and benefits. Manuscrito inédito, UCLAyYale.
Binder, S. A.(1997).Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J.M., yTullock, G.(1962).The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations ofConstitutional Democracy .Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Campbell, A., Cox, G. W., yMcCubbins, M. D.(2002). Agenda power in the Senate, 1877to1986.EnD. W.Brady and M. D.McCubbins (Eds.),Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the Historyof Congress(pp. 218-247). Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford UniversityPress.
Carey, J., yShugart, M. (Eds.)(1998).Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carroll, R., Cox, G. W., yPachón, M.(2004a). How parties create electoral democracy,chapter 2. Ponencia presentadaen la reunión de laAmerican Political ScienceAssociation, Chicago, 1-4, Sept. 2004.
Carroll, R., Cox, G. W., y Pachón, M.(2004b). Shadowing ministers. Manuscrito inédito, University of California, San Diego.
Cook, T. E.(1989).Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Cox, G. W.(1987).The Efficient Secret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G. W.(1993). The development of collective responsibility in the United Kingdom.Parliamentary History,13(1): 32-47.
Cox, G. W.(2001). The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes. EnM.D.McCubbinsyS.Haggard (Eds.) Presidents, Parliaments and Policy(pp. 21-63). New York:Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G. W.(2002). Agenda power in the House of Representatives. En D. W.BradyyM. D.McCubbins (Eds.),Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress ed(pp.107-145). Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Cox, G. W.(2005). Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G. W. y McCubbins M. D. (1993).Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Cox, G. W. Masuyama, M. , yMcCubbins, M. D.(2000). Agenda power in the Japanese House ofRepresentatives.Japanese Journal of Political Science,1(1): 1-22.
Damgaard, E., ySvenson, P.(1989). Who governs? Parties and policies in Denmark.European Journal of Political Research, 17(6): 731-45.
Diermeier, D., yFeddersen, T.(1998). Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidenceprocedure.American Political Science Review, 92(3): 611-22.
Dion, D.(1997).Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change inLegislative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Dion, D.yHuber, J.(1996). Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules.The Journalof Politics, 58(1): 25-53.
Döring, H.(1995). Time as a scarce resource: government control of the agenda. EnH.Döring(Ed.),Parliamentsand Majority Rule in Western Europe(pp. 223-247). Frankfurt:Campus Verlag.
Evans, C. L.(2001). Committees, leaders and message politics. EnDodd yB.Oppenheimer (Eds.),Congress Reconsidered (7ma.edición). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Figueiredo, A. C., yLimongi, F.(1999).Executivo e legislativo na nova ordem constitucional.Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV.
Gilligan, T., yKrehbiel, K.(1990). Organization of informative committees by a rationalLegislature.American Journal of Political Science, 34(2): 531-64.
Green, A.(1979).Devolution and Public Finance: Stormont from 1921 to 1972. Glasgow: Centrefor the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.
Groseclose, T., and McCarty, N.(2000). The politics of blame: bargaining before an audience. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1): 100-19.
Hagevi, M.(2000). Nordic light on committee assignments. En P.EsaiassonyK.Heidar(Eds.)Beyond Westminster andCongress: The Nordic Experience(pp.237-264). Columbus: Ohio StateUniversity Press.
Heller, W. B.(1997). Bicameralism and budget deficits: the effect of parliamentary structure ongovernment spending.Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(4): 485-516.
Heller, W. B.(2001). Making policy stick: why the government gets what it wants in multiparty parliaments.American Journal of Political Science, 45(4): 780-98.
Henning, C.H. C.A.(1995). A formal model of law production by government as a naturalMonopoly. EnH.Döring (Ed.),Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe(pp. 601-614). Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
Huber, J.(1996).Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huber, J.yShipan, C.(2002).Deliberate Discretion?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inman, R., eIngberman, D.(1988). The political economy of fiscal policy.EnP. G.Hare (Ed.),Public Economics: A Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Jones, C.(1970).The Minority Party in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.
Krehbiel, K. (1991).Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Krehbiel, K.yMeirowitz, A.(2002). Power and the motion to recommit.Legislative Studies Quarterly,27(29): 191-218.
Laver, M., yShepsle, K.(1996).Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislaturesin Parliamentary Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Londregan, J.(2000).Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McKelvey, R.(1976). Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implicationsfor agenda control.Journal of Economic Theory, 12(3): 472-82.
Maltzman, F., ySigelman, L.(1996). The politics of talk: unconstrained floor time in theU.S. House of Representatives.Journal of Politics, 58(4): 819-30.
Martin, L. W., yVanberg, G.2004. Policing the bargain: coalition government andparliamentary scrutiny.American Journal of Political Science, 48(1): 13-27.
Muthoo, A., yShepsle, K.A.(2004). Agenda-setting power in organizations with overlapping generations of players. Manuscrito inédito, Harvard University.
Persson, T., Roland, G., yTabellini, G.(2003). How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? Manuscrito inédito.
Poterba, J., yvon Hagen, J. (Eds.). (1999).Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance. Chicago:Chicago University Press.
Rasch, B. E.(2000). “Parliamentary floor voting procedures and agenda setting in Europe”. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25(1): 3-23.
Remington, T. F.(1998). Political conflict and institutional design: paths of party development in Russia. En J.Lowenhardt (Ed.),Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia(pp. 201-223).Londres:Frank Cass.
Remington, T. F.ySmith, S.S.(1995). The development of parliamentary parties inRussia.Legislative Studies Quarterly,20(4): 457-89.
Romer, T., and Rosenthal, H.(1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and thestatus quo.Public Choice, 33(4): 27-44.
Romer, T., and Rosenthal, H.(1979). Bureaucrats versus voters: on the political economy of resource allocation bydirect democracy.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4): 563-87.
Schofield, N.(1978). Intransitivities of simple dynamic games.Review of Economic Studies,45: 575-94.
Shaw, M.(1979). Conclusions. En J. D.Lees and M.Shaw (Eds.),Committees in Legislatures. Oxford:Martin Robertson.
Siavelis, P.(2002). Exaggerated presidentialism and moderate presidents: executive-legislativerelations in Chile. En S.MorgensternyB.Nacif (Eds.),Legislative Politics in Latin America(pp. 79-113). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Somogyvári, I.(1994). Legal institutions in standing orders of the parliaments of advanceddemocracies. En A.Ágh (Ed.),The Emergence of East Central European Parliaments. Budapest:Hungarian Centre of Democracy Studies.
Thies, M.(2001). Keeping tabs on one’s partners: the logic of delegation in coalition governments.American Journal of Political Science,45(3): 580-98.
Thompson, J. A.(1986). Bringing home the bacon: the politics of pork barrel in the North Carolina legislature.Legislative Studies Quarterly, 11(1): 91-108.
Tsebelis, G.(1995). Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies. En H.Döring (Ed.) Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe(pp. 83-113). New York: St Martin’s Press.
Tsebelis, G.(2002).Veto Players. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tsebelis, G.yMoney, J.(1997).Bicameralism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weingast, B.(1992). Fighting fire with fire: amending activity and institutional change inthe post-reform Congress. En R. H.Davidson (Ed.),The Postreform Congress. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Weingast, G.yMarshall, W.(1988). The industrial organization of Congress.Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 96(1): 132-63.
Wittman, D.(1995).The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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2017-06-01
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La organización de las legislaturas democráticas. (2017). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 26(1), 13-34. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/30
