The Dark Side of the Success: Executive´s Bills not Voted by Uruguayan Parliament (2005-2010)

Authors

  • Esteban García Ortíz Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad de la República

Keywords:

Agenda power, Executive Power, Parliament, legislative success

Abstract

The article examines the main reasons why just over one-fifth of the Executive's bills submitted during the XLVIth Legislature were finally archived. As the ruling party had a disciplined majority in Parliament during that period, a particularly high success rate could be expected. However, this did not occur due to the existence of mismatches between the preferences of the government bills and the preferences of the median majority legislator. In addition, the legislative majority in the chamber stumbled across some institutional veto points -standing committees without a majority- where it was unable to exercise its agenda power, which prevented the Parliament to pass an important number of government’sbills.

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Published

2017-07-02

How to Cite

The Dark Side of the Success: Executive´s Bills not Voted by Uruguayan Parliament (2005-2010). (2017). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 26(1), 175-196. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/39