Presidential Decree Power and Legislative Behavior in Argentina
Keywords:
Argentina, President, Congress, decreesAbstract
How do legislators respond to the use of legislative decrees by presidents? This article tests the theories of usurpation, delegation, and strategic convergence considering both the responses to decrees and their specific policy contents in Argentina. Argentinian legislators tacitly approve the overwhelming majority of decrees, even in policy areas where they would have incentives to modify or reject them. The study of one such area, tax policy, supports the theory of strategic convergence: the comparison of the contents of decrees and laws initiated by legislators indicates that presidents construct their decrees seeking to converge with congressional preferences over conflictive policy dimensions
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References
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Baron, D. P. (1989). A non-cooperative theory of legislative coalitions. American Journal of Political Science, 33 (4), 1048-1084.
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Moe,T.yHowell,W. (1999).Unilateral action and presidential power: A theory, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29(4), 850-872.
Negretto, G.(2002). ¿Gobierna solo el presidente? Poderes de decreto y diseño institucional en Brasil y Argentina.Desarrollo Económico ,42 (167),377-404.
Pereira, C., Power,T., yRennó,L.(2005).“Under what conditions do presidents resort to decree power? Theory and evidence from the Brazilian case”. Journal of Politics, 67(1),178-200.
Persson,T.yTabellini,G. (2000).Political economics: explaining economic policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rodden, J. (2006).Hamilton's paradox: the promise and peril of fiscal federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, M.yCarey, J.(1992).Presidents and assemblies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tommasi, M.,Saiegh, S., Sanguinetti, P., Stein,E., y CárdenasM.(2001).Fiscal federalism in Argentina: policies, politics, and institutional reform”. Economia,1,147-201.
Weingast, B., Shepsle,K.y Johnsen, C. (1981).The political economy of benefits and costs: a neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy, 89(4),642-664
Amorim Neto, O.(2003).The presidential calculus executive policy making and cabinet formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies,39(4),415-440.
Amorim Neto, O., Cox,G.,yMcCubbins,M.(2003).Agenda power in Brazil´s camara dos deputados, 1989-98. World Politics, 55(4),550-578.
Baron, D. P. (1989). A non-cooperative theory of legislative coalitions. American Journal of Political Science, 33 (4), 1048-1084.
Bonvecchi,A.,yMustapic, A. (2011). El secreto eficiente del presidencialismo argentino.En M. AlcantaraSaezyM.GarciaMontero.(Eds.),Algo más que presidentes: El papel del Poder Legislativo en América Latina(pp. 305-337). Zaragoza: Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad.
Bonvecchi, A., y Lodola,G.(2011).The dual logic of intergovernmental transfers: presidents, governors, and the politics of coalition-building in Argentina. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 41(2), 179-206.
Carey, J.yShugart, M.(1998a).Calling out the tanks or filling out the forms?EnJ.Carey y M.Shugart (Eds.), Executive Decree Authority(pp.1-29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, J. y Shugart, M.(1998b).Institutional design and executive decree.En J.Carey y M. S.Shugart. (Eds.), Executive Decree Authority(pp. 274-298). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G.yMorgenstern,S.(2001). Legislaturas reactivas y presidentes pro-activos en América Latina. Desarrollo Económico, 163, 373-393.
Eaton, K. (2002). Fiscal Policy Making in the Argentine Legislature. En S.Morgenstern yB.Nacif (Eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America(pp. 287-314). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, D.yO’Halloran,S. (1999).Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferreira Rubio, D. y Goretti,M. (1996). Cuando el Presidente gobierna solo. Menem y los decretos de necesidad y urgencia hasta la Reforma Constitucional.Desarrollo Económico ,36(141), 443-474.
García Montero, M. (2009). Presidentes y Parlamentos ¿quién controla la actividad legislativa en América Latina?Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Gould, A.yBaker,P. (2002). Democracy and taxation. Annual Review of Political Science, 5,87-110.
Howell, W. (2003).Powerwithout persuasion. The politics of direct presidential action. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moe,T.yHowell,W. (1999).Unilateral action and presidential power: A theory, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29(4), 850-872.
Negretto, G.(2002). ¿Gobierna solo el presidente? Poderes de decreto y diseño institucional en Brasil y Argentina.Desarrollo Económico ,42 (167),377-404.
Pereira, C., Power,T., yRennó,L.(2005).“Under what conditions do presidents resort to decree power? Theory and evidence from the Brazilian case”. Journal of Politics, 67(1),178-200.
Persson,T.yTabellini,G. (2000).Political economics: explaining economic policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rodden, J. (2006).Hamilton's paradox: the promise and peril of fiscal federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, M.yCarey, J.(1992).Presidents and assemblies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tommasi, M.,Saiegh, S., Sanguinetti, P., Stein,E., y CárdenasM.(2001).Fiscal federalism in Argentina: policies, politics, and institutional reform”. Economia,1,147-201.
Weingast, B., Shepsle,K.y Johnsen, C. (1981).The political economy of benefits and costs: a neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy, 89(4),642-664
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Published
2017-07-01
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Articles
How to Cite
Presidential Decree Power and Legislative Behavior in Argentina. (2017). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 26(1), 111-130. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/36
