Three constitutional experiments. The complex design process of the Executive branch in Uruguay

Abstract

The Uruguayan constitutional history stands out in the Latin American concert for its inclination to institutional experimentation. Although it took Uruguay ninety years to reform its first Constitution, within the following five decades the political system approved four institutional reforms that affected the political and social rights, the design of the State, the balance between the State powers and the electoral system. This article analyzes the process of reforms developed between 1918 and 1967, considering particularly the design of three different models of organization of the Executive Power: the two-headed model, the collegiate model and the duplex model. These designs sought to avoid the concentration of power in the person of the president and to guarantee some mechanisms for partisan participation in the autonomous bodies of the State. The article proposes to interpret the process of creating institutional models as sophisticated experiments guided by trial and error, and aimed at reaching a satisfactory point of equilibrium for the different political actors.