Harry Blackmun and the Judicial Behavior studies. What can we learn from it?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26851/RUCP.31.2.5Keywords:
Decision making; theories of judicial behavior, judicial rationality, attitudinal models, Justice Harry BlackmunAbstract
This article analyses two key models of judicial decision‑making studies. The aim of this paper is to study the assumptions of the rational choice and attitudinal models in relation to existing studies on the way Justice Harry Blackmun voted during his tenure on the Supreme Court of the United States. In addition, this work analyses four emblematic cases judged by Justice Blackmun, through the perspective of ideological or strategic voting. Theories of voting in judicial behavior presuppose that judicial actors' decisions are guided by two broad types of rational possibilities: 1) they act strategically when align themselves with the choices of the authority who appoints them to office or on whom their re‑election depends; 2) they act out of conviction when, either because of their ideology or because of rulings within the legal technique, they make their decisions. The central thesis of this paper is that the analysis of Justice Blackmun's vote allows us to redefine, extend or look critically at several of the assumptions of the theories and models.
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