The judicial manipulation trap:
A historical analysis of the political manipulation of the Argentina Supreme Court
Keywords:
political manipulation, Supreme Court, Argentina, path dependencyAbstract
Comparative judicial politics has provided invaluable evidence about how the political context of Argentina has systematically affected the independence of its Supreme Court. However, it is still not clear why the manipulation of the court has emerged and persisted over time. The central argument is that the incentives of politicians have impeded the emergence of a stable and independent judiciary. This article provides a systematic analysis of the various strategies that politicians have used to control the Supreme Court of the country by forcing unfriendly justices off the bench and appointing friendly ones. The political court-packing that started in the Supreme Court in 1947 is not the result of the instability of the political regime of the country but rather a common practice that follows a path dependence self-reinforcing process which has recently started to exhibit changes in its tactics and pace.
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References
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AYDIN, A. (2013). Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understying the Varying Impact of Political Competition. Law & Society Review, 47(1), 105-134.
AYDIN-ÇAKIR, A. (2014). Judicialization of Politics by Elected Politicians: The Theory of Strategic Litigation. Political Research Quarterly, 67(3), 489-503.
BASABE-SERRANO, S., y POLGA-HECIMOVICH, J. (2012). Legislative Coalitions and Judicial Turnover under Political Uncertainty: The Case of Ecuador. Political Research Quarterly, 66(1), 153-165.
BIBLIOTECA TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE JUSTICIA DE CÓRDOBA. (2007). Tribunal Superior de Justicia 1852-2007. Córdoba Ciudad Capital, Argentina: Poder Judicial de la Provincia de Córdoba.
BILL CHÁVEZ, R. (2004). The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies. Judicial Politics in Argentina. Stanford, EE. UU.: Stanford University Press.
BILL CHÁVEZ, R. (2007). The Appointment y Removal Process for Judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence. Latin American Politics and Society, 49(2), 33-58.
CARRIÓ, A. (1996). La Corte Suprema y su independencia. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Abeledo-Perrot.
CASTAGNOLA, A. (2012). I Want It All, and I Want It Now: The Political Manipulation of Argentina’s Provincial High Courts. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 4(2), 39-62.
CASTAGNOLA, A. (2018). Manipulating Courts in New Democracies. Forcing Judges off the Bench in Argentina. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Routledge.
CASTAGNOLA, A., y PEREZ-LIÑÁN, A. (2011). Bolivia: The Rise (and Fall) of Judicial Review. En G. Helmke y J. Ríos-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 278-305). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
DEPARTAMENTO HISTÓRICO-JUDICIAL. (2006). Ministros de la Suprema Corte de Justicia 1875-2006. La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina: Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
DIAMOND, L. (1999). Developing Democracy - Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, EE. UU.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
GRZYMALA-BUSSE, A. (2011). Time Will Tell? Temporality and the Analysis of Casual Mechanisms y Processes. Comparative Political Studies, 44(9), 1267-1297.
HAGLE, T. M. (1993). Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme Court. Political Behavior, 15(1), 25-48.
HELMKE, G. (2005). Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. Cambridge; New York, Reino Unido, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
HELMKE, G. (2017). Institutions on the Edge: The Origins y Consequences of Inter-Branch Crisis in Latin America. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
HERRON, E. S., y RYAZZO, K. A. (2003). The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts. The Journal of Politics, 65(2), 422-438.
HILBINK, L. (2012). The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence. World Politics, 64(4), 587-621.
HIRSCHL, R. (2007). Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Massachusetts, EE. UU.: Harvard University Press.
IARYCZOWER, M., SPILLER P. T., y TOMMASI, M. (2002). Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998. American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 699-716.
JACQUELIN, C. A. (29 de noviembre de 1998). Nueve años en la frontera. La Nación. Recuperado de <https://bit.ly/2Ta4S86>.
KAPISZEWSKI, D. (2012). High Courts y Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
KAPISZEWSKI, D., y TAYLOR, M. M. (2008). Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America. Perspectives on Politics, 6(4), 741-767.
MAINWARING, S., y PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, A. (2013). Democracies y Dictatorship in Latin America. Emergence, Survival y Fall. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
MATYSZAK, D. (2006). Creating a Compliant Judiciary in Zimbabwe, 2000-2003. En K. Malleson y P. H. Russell (Eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (pp. 331-354). Toronto, Canadá: University of Toronto Press.
MOLINELLI, G. (Coord). (1999). La Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación frente a los poderes políticos, a través del control de constitucionalidad, 1983-1998. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Instituto de Investigaciones «Ambrosio Gioja».
MONTILLA ZAVALÍA, F. A. (2007). Historia del Poder Judicial de Tucumán (1950-2005). San Miguel de Tucumán, Argentina: Edición oficial Poder Judicial de Tucumán.
NINO, C. (2005). Un país al margen de la ley. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ariel.
NORTH, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
OTEIZA, E. (1994). La Corte Suprema. Entre la justicia sin política y la política sin justicia. La Plata, Argentina: Librería editora Plantense SRL.
OYHANARTE, J. (1972). Historia del poder Judicial. Todo es Historia, (61), 86-121.
PALACIOS, J. M. (2018). La Justicia Peronista: la construcción de un nuevo orden legal. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo XXI Editores.
PELLET LASTRA, A. (2001). Historia Política de la Corte (1930-1990). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ad-Hoc.
PÉREZ GUILHOU, D. (1989). La Corte Suprema de Justicia y de los Gobiernos de Facto (1861-1983). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Depalma.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, A., y CASTAGNOLA. A. (2009). Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin America: A Long-Term View (1904-2006). Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1(2), 87-114.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, A., y CASTAGNOLA. A. (2016). Judicial Instability y Endogenous Constitutional Change: Lessons from Latin America. British Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 395-416.
PIERSON, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251-267.
PIERSON, P. (2004). Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, Oxford, EE. UU., Reino Unido: Princeton University Press.
PODER JUDICIAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE MENDOZA. (2009). Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Mendoza. Mendoza, Argentina: D. d. C. y Protocolo.
POPOVA, M. (2012). Politicized Justices in Emerging Democracies. A Study of Courts in Russia y Ukraine. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
RÍOS-FIGUEROA, J. (2007). Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002. Latin American Politics y Society, 49(1), 31-57.
RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA, J. C. (2011). Strategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court. En G. Helmke y J. Ríos-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 81-98). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
SÁNCHEZ, A., MAGALONI, B., y MAGAR, E. (2011). Legalist versus Interpretativist: The Supreme Court and the Democratic Transition in Mexico. En G. Helmke y J. Ríos-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 187-218). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
SMULOVITZ, C. (1995). Constitución y Poder Judicial en la nueva democracia Argentina. La experiencia de las instituciones. En C. Acuña (Ed.), La nueva matriz política argentina (pp. 71-114 ). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Nueva Visión.
SPILLER, P. T., y TOMMASI, M. (2007). The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
SPRIGGS, J. F. II, y WAHLBECK, P. J. (1995). Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991. Political Research Quarterly, 48(3), 573-597.
VERBITSKY, H. (1993). Hacer la Corte. La construcción de un poder absoluto sin justicia ni control. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Edición Planeta.
VONDOEPP, P. (2006). Politics y Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging Democracies: High Court Behavior in Malawi y Zambia. Political Research Quarterly, 59(3), 389-399.
VONDOEPP, P., y ELLETT, R. (2011). Reworking Strategic Models of Executive-Judicial Relations. Insights from New African Democracies. Comparative Politics, 43(2), 147-165.
WIDNER, J., y SCHER, D. (2008). Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democracies: Uganda and Zimbabwe. En T. Ginsburg y T. Moustafa (Eds.), Rule by Law. The Politics of Courts an Authoritarian Regimes (pp. 235-260). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
ZORN, C. J. , y VAN WINKLE, S. R. (2000). A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789-1992. Political Behavior, 22(2), 145-166.
AYDIN, A. (2013). Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understying the Varying Impact of Political Competition. Law & Society Review, 47(1), 105-134.
AYDIN-ÇAKIR, A. (2014). Judicialization of Politics by Elected Politicians: The Theory of Strategic Litigation. Political Research Quarterly, 67(3), 489-503.
BASABE-SERRANO, S., y POLGA-HECIMOVICH, J. (2012). Legislative Coalitions and Judicial Turnover under Political Uncertainty: The Case of Ecuador. Political Research Quarterly, 66(1), 153-165.
BIBLIOTECA TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE JUSTICIA DE CÓRDOBA. (2007). Tribunal Superior de Justicia 1852-2007. Córdoba Ciudad Capital, Argentina: Poder Judicial de la Provincia de Córdoba.
BILL CHÁVEZ, R. (2004). The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies. Judicial Politics in Argentina. Stanford, EE. UU.: Stanford University Press.
BILL CHÁVEZ, R. (2007). The Appointment y Removal Process for Judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence. Latin American Politics and Society, 49(2), 33-58.
CARRIÓ, A. (1996). La Corte Suprema y su independencia. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Abeledo-Perrot.
CASTAGNOLA, A. (2012). I Want It All, and I Want It Now: The Political Manipulation of Argentina’s Provincial High Courts. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 4(2), 39-62.
CASTAGNOLA, A. (2018). Manipulating Courts in New Democracies. Forcing Judges off the Bench in Argentina. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Routledge.
CASTAGNOLA, A., y PEREZ-LIÑÁN, A. (2011). Bolivia: The Rise (and Fall) of Judicial Review. En G. Helmke y J. Ríos-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 278-305). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
DEPARTAMENTO HISTÓRICO-JUDICIAL. (2006). Ministros de la Suprema Corte de Justicia 1875-2006. La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina: Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
DIAMOND, L. (1999). Developing Democracy - Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, EE. UU.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
GRZYMALA-BUSSE, A. (2011). Time Will Tell? Temporality and the Analysis of Casual Mechanisms y Processes. Comparative Political Studies, 44(9), 1267-1297.
HAGLE, T. M. (1993). Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme Court. Political Behavior, 15(1), 25-48.
HELMKE, G. (2005). Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. Cambridge; New York, Reino Unido, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
HELMKE, G. (2017). Institutions on the Edge: The Origins y Consequences of Inter-Branch Crisis in Latin America. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
HERRON, E. S., y RYAZZO, K. A. (2003). The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts. The Journal of Politics, 65(2), 422-438.
HILBINK, L. (2012). The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence. World Politics, 64(4), 587-621.
HIRSCHL, R. (2007). Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Massachusetts, EE. UU.: Harvard University Press.
IARYCZOWER, M., SPILLER P. T., y TOMMASI, M. (2002). Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998. American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 699-716.
JACQUELIN, C. A. (29 de noviembre de 1998). Nueve años en la frontera. La Nación. Recuperado de <https://bit.ly/2Ta4S86>.
KAPISZEWSKI, D. (2012). High Courts y Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
KAPISZEWSKI, D., y TAYLOR, M. M. (2008). Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America. Perspectives on Politics, 6(4), 741-767.
MAINWARING, S., y PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, A. (2013). Democracies y Dictatorship in Latin America. Emergence, Survival y Fall. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
MATYSZAK, D. (2006). Creating a Compliant Judiciary in Zimbabwe, 2000-2003. En K. Malleson y P. H. Russell (Eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (pp. 331-354). Toronto, Canadá: University of Toronto Press.
MOLINELLI, G. (Coord). (1999). La Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación frente a los poderes políticos, a través del control de constitucionalidad, 1983-1998. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Instituto de Investigaciones «Ambrosio Gioja».
MONTILLA ZAVALÍA, F. A. (2007). Historia del Poder Judicial de Tucumán (1950-2005). San Miguel de Tucumán, Argentina: Edición oficial Poder Judicial de Tucumán.
NINO, C. (2005). Un país al margen de la ley. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ariel.
NORTH, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Nueva York, EE. UU.: Cambridge University Press.
OTEIZA, E. (1994). La Corte Suprema. Entre la justicia sin política y la política sin justicia. La Plata, Argentina: Librería editora Plantense SRL.
OYHANARTE, J. (1972). Historia del poder Judicial. Todo es Historia, (61), 86-121.
PALACIOS, J. M. (2018). La Justicia Peronista: la construcción de un nuevo orden legal. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo XXI Editores.
PELLET LASTRA, A. (2001). Historia Política de la Corte (1930-1990). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ad-Hoc.
PÉREZ GUILHOU, D. (1989). La Corte Suprema de Justicia y de los Gobiernos de Facto (1861-1983). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Depalma.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, A., y CASTAGNOLA. A. (2009). Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin America: A Long-Term View (1904-2006). Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1(2), 87-114.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, A., y CASTAGNOLA. A. (2016). Judicial Instability y Endogenous Constitutional Change: Lessons from Latin America. British Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 395-416.
PIERSON, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251-267.
PIERSON, P. (2004). Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, Oxford, EE. UU., Reino Unido: Princeton University Press.
PODER JUDICIAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE MENDOZA. (2009). Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Mendoza. Mendoza, Argentina: D. d. C. y Protocolo.
POPOVA, M. (2012). Politicized Justices in Emerging Democracies. A Study of Courts in Russia y Ukraine. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
RÍOS-FIGUEROA, J. (2007). Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002. Latin American Politics y Society, 49(1), 31-57.
RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA, J. C. (2011). Strategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court. En G. Helmke y J. Ríos-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 81-98). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
SÁNCHEZ, A., MAGALONI, B., y MAGAR, E. (2011). Legalist versus Interpretativist: The Supreme Court and the Democratic Transition in Mexico. En G. Helmke y J. Ríos-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America (pp. 187-218). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
SMULOVITZ, C. (1995). Constitución y Poder Judicial en la nueva democracia Argentina. La experiencia de las instituciones. En C. Acuña (Ed.), La nueva matriz política argentina (pp. 71-114 ). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Nueva Visión.
SPILLER, P. T., y TOMMASI, M. (2007). The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina. Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
SPRIGGS, J. F. II, y WAHLBECK, P. J. (1995). Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991. Political Research Quarterly, 48(3), 573-597.
VERBITSKY, H. (1993). Hacer la Corte. La construcción de un poder absoluto sin justicia ni control. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Edición Planeta.
VONDOEPP, P. (2006). Politics y Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging Democracies: High Court Behavior in Malawi y Zambia. Political Research Quarterly, 59(3), 389-399.
VONDOEPP, P., y ELLETT, R. (2011). Reworking Strategic Models of Executive-Judicial Relations. Insights from New African Democracies. Comparative Politics, 43(2), 147-165.
WIDNER, J., y SCHER, D. (2008). Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democracies: Uganda and Zimbabwe. En T. Ginsburg y T. Moustafa (Eds.), Rule by Law. The Politics of Courts an Authoritarian Regimes (pp. 235-260). Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
ZORN, C. J. , y VAN WINKLE, S. R. (2000). A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789-1992. Political Behavior, 22(2), 145-166.
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Published
2020-06-02
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The judicial manipulation trap:: A historical analysis of the political manipulation of the Argentina Supreme Court. (2020). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 29(1), 49-80. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/454
