Keep your Friends Close, and your Enemies Closer: Legislative Behavior and Coalitions Discipline in Chile during the Government of Sebastián Piñera
Keywords:
Legislative behavior, executive branch, legislator, Congress, ChileAbstract
The aim of this paper is to explain the causes of the legislative success in the presidential term led by Sebastian Piñera (2010-2014). We use this period because it has been the only period ruled by the right-wing coalition since the return to democracy. Analyzing roll call votes and committees formation in the Chilean Congress, we compare the strategies devised by Sebastián Piñera for approving their bills with the previous strategies utilized by the ‘Concertación’ during two decades (1990-2010). We argue that the legislative success of Sebastián Piñera was due to his ability to maintain the same two political games employed by the ‘Concertación’ governments: to boost a high degree of unity in the pro-government parties and to reach particular agreements with specific members of the opposition.
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References
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Alemán, E. y Navia, P. (2009). Institutions and the Legislative Success of 'Strong' Presidents: An Analysis of Government Bills in Chile. Journal of Latin American Studies,41 (3), 467-91.
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Nolte, D.(2003). El Congreso chileno y su aporte a la consolidación democrática en perspectiva comparada. Revista de Ciencia Política, XXIII (2), 43-67.
Siavelis, P.(2002). Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presidents: Executive-Legislative Relations in Chile. En S.Morgenstern y B.Nacif (Ed.), Legislative Politics in Latin America(79-113). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Toro, S. (2007) Conducta legislativa ante las iniciativas del Ejecutivo: Unidad de los bloques políticos en Chile.Revista de Ciencia Política,27 (1), 23-41.
Toro, S., Acevedo, C. y Matamala, K. (2010). Quebrando paradigmas en contextos presidencialistas: un examen sobre la capacidad legislativa en Chile. RIEL - Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudios Legislativos. 1(1), 102-10.
Visconti, G. (2011). Comportamiento diacrónico del Congreso en Chile: ¿Crecimiento o estancamiento de su influencia?. Revista de Ciencia Política,31(1), 91-115.
Alemán, E. y Navia, P. (2009). Institutions and the Legislative Success of 'Strong' Presidents: An Analysis of Government Bills in Chile. Journal of Latin American Studies,41 (3), 467-91.
Alemán, E. y Pachón, M. (2008). Las Comisiones de Conciliación en los procesos legislativos de Chile y Colombia. Política y Gobierno, 15 (1), 3-34.
Alemán, E. y Saiegh, S. (2007). Legislative Preferences, Political Parties, and Coalition Unity in Chile. Comparative Politics, 39(3), 253-72.
Altman, D., Toro, S. y Piñeiro, R. (2008). International Influences on Democratic Transitions: The Successful Case of Chile. CDDRL Working Papers, 66,Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Workshop, Stanford University.
Amorim Neto, O., Cox, G. y McCubbins, M. (2003). Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara Dos Deputados, 1989-98. World Politics, 55(4), 550-78.
Carey, J. (2006). Las Virtudes del Sistema Binominal. Revista Ciencia Política, 26 (1), 226-35.
Carey, J.(2002). Parties, Coalitions, and the Chilean Congress in the 1990s. En S.Morgenstern y B.Nacif (Ed.), Legislative Politics in Latin America (222-53). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chasquetti, D. (2011). El secreto del éxito: presidentes y carteles legislativos en Uruguay (1995-2010). Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 20 (1), 9-31.
Cox, G. y McCubbins, M. (2003). Legislative Leviathan Revisited.San Diego: Department of Political Science, UC.
Cox, G. y McCubbins, M.(1993). Lesgislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jones, M. y Hwang, W.(2005). Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S Congress. American Journal of Political Science, 49(2), 267-82.
Londregan, J. (2002). Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile.New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, S. y Pérez-Liñan, A. (1997). Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXII, 453-83.
Morgenstern, S. (2004). Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morgenstern, S.(2002). Towards a Model of Latin American Legislatures. En Morgenstern, S. y Nacif, B. (Ed.), Legislative Politics in Latin America(pp. 222-53). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nolte, D.(2003). El Congreso chileno y su aporte a la consolidación democrática en perspectiva comparada. Revista de Ciencia Política, XXIII (2), 43-67.
Siavelis, P.(2002). Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presidents: Executive-Legislative Relations in Chile. En S.Morgenstern y B.Nacif (Ed.), Legislative Politics in Latin America(79-113). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Siavelis, P.(2000). The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile.Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Sierra, L.(2012). Quórum Legislativo de Supramayoría y Tribunal Constitucional en Chile. En SELA (Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política) Papers, 101, Recuperado de http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/101
Toro, S. y Hurtado, N.(2016). The Executive on the Battlefield: Government Amendments and Cartel Theory in the Chilean Congress. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 22(2), 196-215.
Toro, S. (2007) Conducta legislativa ante las iniciativas del Ejecutivo: Unidad de los bloques políticos en Chile.Revista de Ciencia Política,27 (1), 23-41.
Toro, S., Acevedo, C. y Matamala, K. (2010). Quebrando paradigmas en contextos presidencialistas: un examen sobre la capacidad legislativa en Chile. RIEL - Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudios Legislativos. 1(1), 102-10.
Visconti, G. (2011). Comportamiento diacrónico del Congreso en Chile: ¿Crecimiento o estancamiento de su influencia?. Revista de Ciencia Política,31(1), 91-115.
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Published
2017-07-02
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Keep your Friends Close, and your Enemies Closer: Legislative Behavior and Coalitions Discipline in Chile during the Government of Sebastián Piñera. (2017). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 26(1), 131-149. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/37
