Every breath you take, I will be watching you: contestation and provincial control of national legislators’ political careers in Argentina
Keywords:
Political contestation, legislative professionalism, ArgentinaAbstract
Most of the literature about the Argentinean National Congress submits that, notwithstanding the province they represent, legislators do not professionalize in office. However, this paper argues that the level of provincial politicalcontestation is a relevant variable in order to explain this phenomenon. A lower level of political contestation would be associated with a greater professionalism from legislators, since governors do not consider them as political challengers. On the contrary,in the face ofa greater level of provincial political contestation, governors woulddiscouragetheir professionalization to diminish the threat to theirsurvival in office. The statistical analysiscoversthe period 1999-2013, and contemplates all Argentinean senators and deputies elected at the national level.
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References
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Mustapic, A. M. (1997). El papel del congreso enAmérica Latina.Revista Contribuciones,14(4).
O’Donnell, G. y Schmitter, P. (1988). Transiciones desde un gobierno autoritario: Conclusiones tentativas sobre las democracias inciertas. Buenos Aires:Paidós.
Rossi, M., y Tommasi, M.(2012). Legislative effort and career paths in the Argentine Congress.IDB Working Paper Series, 378.
Samuels, D. J.(2002). Pork barreling is not credit claiming or advertising: campaign finance and the sources of the personal vote in Brazil. The Journal of Politics,64(3),845-863.
Schlesinger, J. (1966). Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.Chicago:Rand McNally & Co.
Siavelis, P., y Morgenstern, S. (2008). Political recruitment and candidate selection in Latin America: a framework for analysis. En P. M.Siavelis, y S.Morgenstern (Eds.),Pathways to Power (pp. 27-58). Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Spiller, P.,yTommasi, M. (2000). El funcionamiento de las instituciones políticas y las políticas públicas en la Argentina: una aproximación desde la nueva economía institucional.Desarrollo Económico ,40(159),425-464.
Squire, P. (1992). Legislative professionalization and membership diversity in state legislatures.Legislative Studies Quarterly,17(1),69-79.
Squire, P. (2007). Measuring state legislative professionalism: The squire index revisited.State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 7 (2),211-227.
Squire, P.(2008). The state wealth-legislative compensation effect.Canadian Journal of Political Science , 41(1),1-18. [ Links ]
Tchintian, C. (2009). Gobernadores en política nacional. Una revisión teórica.Colección, 20,107-132.
Vanhanen, T. (2000). A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998.Journal of Peace Research,37(2), 251-265.
Álvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., y Przeworski, A. (1996). Classifying political regimes.Studies in Comparative International Development, 31 (2),3-36.
Behrend, J.(2011). The unevenness of democracy at the subnational level: provincial closed games in Argentina.Latin American Research Review,46 (1), 150-76.
Bieda, T. (2015). ¿Quién eres? Carreras políticas de los legisladores encargados del control en Argentina (2001-2013), Revista SAAP (Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político),9(2), 293-311.
Borchert, J. (2003).Professional politicians: Towards a comparative perspective. En J.Borchert, y J.Zeiss (Eds.),The Political Class in Advanced Democracies(pp. 1-25). A Comparative Handbook.Oxford:Oxford University Press.
Cabezas Rincón, L. M. (2011). Profesionalización de las élites parlamentarias en Bolivia, Colombia y Perú,Postdata,16(2), 223-258.
Calvo, E. y Murillo, M. V. (2004). Who delivers? Partisan clients in theArgentineelectoral market, American Journal of Political Science,48(4),742-757.
Coppedge, M., y Reinicke, W. (1991). Measuring Poliarchy.En A.Inkeles (Ed.) On measuring democracy: Its consequences and concomitants(pp. 47-68).New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: participation and opposition.New Haven:Yale University Press.
Eaton, K. (2002). Fiscal Policy Making in the Argentine Legislature. En S.Morgenstern yB.Nacif (Eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America(pp. 287-314). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Gasiorowski, M. (1996). An overview of the political regime change dataset.Comparative Political Studies, 29(4), 469-483.
Gervasoni, C. (2011). A rentier theory of subnational regimes: fiscal federalism, democracy and authoritarianism in the Argentine provinces. World Politics, 62(2),302-40.
Gibson, E. (2012). Boundary Control. Subnational Auhtoritarianism in Federal Democracies.Cambridge University Press.
Giraudy, A. (2015). Democrats and autocrats: pathways of subnational undemocratic regime continuity within democratic countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, E., Wibbels, E., y Myukiyehe, E. (2008). Lessons from strange cases: democracy, development and the resource course in the U.S. States. Comparative Political Studies, 41 (4/5), 477-514.
Herrick, R., y Moore, M. (1993). Political ambition’s effect on legislative behavior: Schlesinger’s typology reconsider and revised.TheJournal of Politics, 55 (3), 765-76.
Jones, M. P.(1997).Federalism and the number of parties in Argentine congressional elections.The Journal of Politics , 59(2),538-549.
Jones, M. P.(2008). The recruitment and selection of legislative candidates in Argentina. En P.Siavelis y S.Morgenstern (Eds.), Pathways to Power (pp. 41-75). Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Jones, M., Saiegh, S., Spiller, P., y Tommasi, M. (2002). Amateur legislators-professional politicians: the consequences of party-centered electoral rules in a federal system.American Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), 656-669.
Jones, M. P., y Hwang, W. (2005). Party government in presidential democracies: Extending cartel theory beyond the US Congress. American Journal of Political Science,49(2),267-282.
Krehbiel, K. (1992). Information and Legislative Organization. Michigan:University of Michigan Press.
Leiras, M. (2013). Las contradicciones aparentes del federalismo argentino y sus consecuencias políticas y sociales. En C.Acuña (Ed.), ¿Cuánto importan las instituciones? Gobierno, estado y actores en la política argentina(pp. 209-248).Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
Levitsky, S., y Way, L. (2002). Elecciones sin democracia: El surgimiento del autoritarismo competitivo.Estudios Políticos, 24,159-176.
Levitsky, S., y Way, L.(2010). Why democracy needs a level playing field.Journal of Democracy, 21, 1, 57-68.
Linz, J. (2000). Totalitarian and AuthoritarianRegimes.Boulder, Colorado: LynneRiennerPublishers.
Lodola, G.(2009). La estructura subnacional de las carreras políticas en Argentina y Brasil, Desarrollo Económico, 49 (194), 247-286.
Marshall, M. yJaggers, K. (2001). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-1999 Dataset User’s Manual, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
McCubbins, M., Noll, R., y Weingast, B. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control.Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,3(2),243-277.
Mayhew, D. (1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Micozzi, J. P. (2013). Ellos los representantes, nosotros los representados: reflexiones sobre la representación y la conexión electoral en la Argentina contemporánea,Revista SAAP (Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político), 7(2), 401-411.
Morlino, L. (1985). Las alternativas no democráticas. Postdata ,10, 149-183.
Munck, G., yVerkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices.Comparativepoliticalstudies, 35, 1, 5-34.
Mustapic, A. M. (1997). El papel del congreso enAmérica Latina.Revista Contribuciones,14(4).
O’Donnell, G. y Schmitter, P. (1988). Transiciones desde un gobierno autoritario: Conclusiones tentativas sobre las democracias inciertas. Buenos Aires:Paidós.
Rossi, M., y Tommasi, M.(2012). Legislative effort and career paths in the Argentine Congress.IDB Working Paper Series, 378.
Samuels, D. J.(2002). Pork barreling is not credit claiming or advertising: campaign finance and the sources of the personal vote in Brazil. The Journal of Politics,64(3),845-863.
Schlesinger, J. (1966). Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.Chicago:Rand McNally & Co.
Siavelis, P., y Morgenstern, S. (2008). Political recruitment and candidate selection in Latin America: a framework for analysis. En P. M.Siavelis, y S.Morgenstern (Eds.),Pathways to Power (pp. 27-58). Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Spiller, P.,yTommasi, M. (2000). El funcionamiento de las instituciones políticas y las políticas públicas en la Argentina: una aproximación desde la nueva economía institucional.Desarrollo Económico ,40(159),425-464.
Squire, P. (1992). Legislative professionalization and membership diversity in state legislatures.Legislative Studies Quarterly,17(1),69-79.
Squire, P. (2007). Measuring state legislative professionalism: The squire index revisited.State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 7 (2),211-227.
Squire, P.(2008). The state wealth-legislative compensation effect.Canadian Journal of Political Science , 41(1),1-18. [ Links ]
Tchintian, C. (2009). Gobernadores en política nacional. Una revisión teórica.Colección, 20,107-132.
Vanhanen, T. (2000). A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998.Journal of Peace Research,37(2), 251-265.
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Published
2017-06-01
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Articles
How to Cite
Every breath you take, I will be watching you: contestation and provincial control of national legislators’ political careers in Argentina. (2017). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 26(1), 85-109. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/34
