Elections and economic framework results in Latin America (1979-1998)
Keywords:
Elections, Economy, Latin AmericaAbstract
Abstract One of the main theories conceming politico-economic cycles claims that, in arder to remain in power, governments strategically manipulate public policy. This results in the so-called opportunistic electoral cycle, with improvements in macroeconomic outputs during electoral years but negative results for those indicators in post-electoral periods. However, a government' s potential to impose its policy objectives depend on its agenda-setting power, a dimension that has not been taken into account in traditional theories of cycles in macroeconomic policy. This article suggests that the majority or minority nature of a government is a key factor in determining the political and institutional conditions that facilitate or block the emergence of opportunistic political cycles in the economy. By testing this hypothesis in the case of Latin American democracies during the 1979- 1998 period, this article shows that macroeconomic indicators reflecting opportunistic behavior are more often present in the case of majority govemments, which are also frequently associated with
good economic performance.
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