The reform of presidentialism in Latin America. Towards a hybrid model
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.27.6Keywords:
presidential power, separation of powers, constitutional reform, Latin AmericaAbstract
This article analyzes the constitutional changes that have altered the power of presidents in Latin America between 1978 and 2014. It argues that reform trends in this matter have moved in opposite directions. Rules that reduce the likelihood that the president will have majority support in Congress have been incorporated, along with other rules that increase the president’s power to negotiate with legislators. On the other hand, while many reforms are aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Congress to supervise the governing powers of the Executive, other reforms that concentrate Legislative Power in the hands of the president were adopted. In this hybrid design, the adopted reforms coexist in tension and have a contradictory impact on the real power of the presidents, in such a way that it is as incorrect to speak of an advance of hyperpresidentialism as of a systematic reduction of the power of the presidents in all its dimensions.
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
References
Amorim Neto, O. (2002). “Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil”, en Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Archer, R. y Shugart, M. (1997). “The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 110-159. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, John (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Carey, John y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1998). Executive Decree Authority. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Cárdenas, Mauricio, Roberto Junguito , y Mónica Pachón (2006). Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution. Research Network Working Paper # R-508. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Cox, G. y Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Epilogue: Latin America´s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif (Eds.) Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, José Antonio. (2007). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z. y Ginsburg, T. (2012). “Still the Land of Presidentialism? Executives and the Latin American Constitution”, en D. Nolte y A. Schilling-Vacaflor (Eds.), New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices. Farham: Ashgate.
Crisp, B. (1998). “Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela”, en C. John y M. Shugart (Eds.), Executive Decree Authority. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Gargarella, Roberto (2013). Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press.
Grindle, Merilee (2000). Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Helmke, G. (2005). “Enduring Uncertainty: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina During the 1990s and Beyond”, en S. Levitsky y M. V. Murillo (Eds.), The Politics of Institutional Weakness. Argentine Democracy, 139-162. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Helmke, G. y Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2011). “Introduction: Courts in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 1-26. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1997). Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Mayhew, D. (2008). “Incumbency Advantage in US Presidential Elections: The Historical Record”, Political Science Quarterly, 123 (2), pp. 201-228.
Montero, Alfred P. y David J. Samuels (Eds.) (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Towards a Model of Latin American Legislatures”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif, (Eds.) , Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Negretto, G. y Aguilar-Rivera, J. A. (2000). “Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina (18531-912) and Mexico (18571-910)”, Journal of Latin American Studies 32, pp. 361-397.
Negretto, Gabriel (2013a). Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
(2013) “El Papel de la Constitución en la Nueva Democracia Argentina”, Revista de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, 7 (2), Diciembre.
(2011). “Shifting Constitutional Designs in Latin America: A Two-Level Explanation”, Texas Law Review, 89 (7), pp. 1777-1806.
(2009a). “Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America”, British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 39, pp. 117-139.
(2009b). “La Reforma Electoral en América Latina. Entre el Interés Partidario y las Demandas Ciudadanas”, en A. Fontaine, C. Larroulet, J. Navarrete e I. Walter (Eds.), Reforma del Sistema Electora Chileno, pp. 63-103. Santiago de Chile: PNUD.
(2007). “Propuesta para una reforma electoral en México”, Política y Gobierno XIV(1), pp. 200-215.
(2006). “Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America”, The Journal of Politics, 68 (2) Mayo, pp. 421-433.
(2004). “Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, pp. 531-62.
(2003). “Diseño Constitucional y Separación de Poderes en América Latina”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 65 (1), pp. 41-76.
Nino, C. (1992). “Ideas and Attempts at Reforming the Presidentialist System of Government in Latin America”, en A. Lijphart (Ed.), Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, pp. 128-132. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press .
O´Donnell, G. (1994). “Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 5 (1), pp. 55-69.
O’Neill, Kathleen (2005). Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Rios-Figueroa, J. (2007). “Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002”, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 31-57.
(2011). “Institutions for Constitutional Justice in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 27-54. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Saiegh, S. (2015). “Executive-Legislative Relations”, en Jennifer Ghandi y Ruben Ruiz-Rufino (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. NuevaYork: Routledge.
Sarabia Better, Arturo (2003). Reformas políticas en Colombia: del plebiscito de 1957 al referendo de 2003. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
Serrafero, Mario (2005). Exceptocracia: ¿Confín de la Democracia? Intervención Federal, Estado de Sitio y Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia. Buenos Aires: Editorial Lumiere.
Shugart, M. (1995). “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government”, American Political Science Review 89(2), pp. 327-343.
(1998). “The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices”, British Journal of Political Science 28(1), pp. 1-29.
Shugart, M. y Carey, J. (1992). President and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, M. y Carey. J (1995). “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14(4), pp. 417-439.
Shugart, M. y Haggard, S. (2001). “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems”, en Haggard. S, y McCubins M. (Eds.). Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, 64-104. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, W. (1945). “Parliamentary Government in Latin America”, American Political Science Review 39(3), pp. 522-536.
Uprimny, R. (2004). “The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in Colombia”, en S. Gloppen, R. Gargarella y Skaar, E. (Eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies. Londres: Frank Cass, pp. 46-69.
Weldon, J. (1997). “Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 2252-58. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Zovatto, Daniel, y Jesus Orozco Henriquez (Eds.) (2008). Reforma Política y Electoral en América Latina, 1978-2007. Ciudad de México: UNAM.
Archer, R. y Shugart, M. (1997). “The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 110-159. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, John (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Carey, John y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1998). Executive Decree Authority. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Cárdenas, Mauricio, Roberto Junguito , y Mónica Pachón (2006). Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution. Research Network Working Paper # R-508. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Cox, G. y Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Epilogue: Latin America´s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif (Eds.) Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, José Antonio. (2007). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z. y Ginsburg, T. (2012). “Still the Land of Presidentialism? Executives and the Latin American Constitution”, en D. Nolte y A. Schilling-Vacaflor (Eds.), New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices. Farham: Ashgate.
Crisp, B. (1998). “Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela”, en C. John y M. Shugart (Eds.), Executive Decree Authority. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Gargarella, Roberto (2013). Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press.
Grindle, Merilee (2000). Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Helmke, G. (2005). “Enduring Uncertainty: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina During the 1990s and Beyond”, en S. Levitsky y M. V. Murillo (Eds.), The Politics of Institutional Weakness. Argentine Democracy, 139-162. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Helmke, G. y Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2011). “Introduction: Courts in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 1-26. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1997). Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Mayhew, D. (2008). “Incumbency Advantage in US Presidential Elections: The Historical Record”, Political Science Quarterly, 123 (2), pp. 201-228.
Montero, Alfred P. y David J. Samuels (Eds.) (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Towards a Model of Latin American Legislatures”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif, (Eds.) , Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Negretto, G. y Aguilar-Rivera, J. A. (2000). “Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina (18531-912) and Mexico (18571-910)”, Journal of Latin American Studies 32, pp. 361-397.
Negretto, Gabriel (2013a). Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
(2013) “El Papel de la Constitución en la Nueva Democracia Argentina”, Revista de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, 7 (2), Diciembre.
(2011). “Shifting Constitutional Designs in Latin America: A Two-Level Explanation”, Texas Law Review, 89 (7), pp. 1777-1806.
(2009a). “Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America”, British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 39, pp. 117-139.
(2009b). “La Reforma Electoral en América Latina. Entre el Interés Partidario y las Demandas Ciudadanas”, en A. Fontaine, C. Larroulet, J. Navarrete e I. Walter (Eds.), Reforma del Sistema Electora Chileno, pp. 63-103. Santiago de Chile: PNUD.
(2007). “Propuesta para una reforma electoral en México”, Política y Gobierno XIV(1), pp. 200-215.
(2006). “Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America”, The Journal of Politics, 68 (2) Mayo, pp. 421-433.
(2004). “Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, pp. 531-62.
(2003). “Diseño Constitucional y Separación de Poderes en América Latina”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 65 (1), pp. 41-76.
Nino, C. (1992). “Ideas and Attempts at Reforming the Presidentialist System of Government in Latin America”, en A. Lijphart (Ed.), Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, pp. 128-132. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press .
O´Donnell, G. (1994). “Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 5 (1), pp. 55-69.
O’Neill, Kathleen (2005). Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Rios-Figueroa, J. (2007). “Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002”, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 31-57.
(2011). “Institutions for Constitutional Justice in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 27-54. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Saiegh, S. (2015). “Executive-Legislative Relations”, en Jennifer Ghandi y Ruben Ruiz-Rufino (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. NuevaYork: Routledge.
Sarabia Better, Arturo (2003). Reformas políticas en Colombia: del plebiscito de 1957 al referendo de 2003. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
Serrafero, Mario (2005). Exceptocracia: ¿Confín de la Democracia? Intervención Federal, Estado de Sitio y Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia. Buenos Aires: Editorial Lumiere.
Shugart, M. (1995). “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government”, American Political Science Review 89(2), pp. 327-343.
(1998). “The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices”, British Journal of Political Science 28(1), pp. 1-29.
Shugart, M. y Carey, J. (1992). President and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, M. y Carey. J (1995). “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14(4), pp. 417-439.
Shugart, M. y Haggard, S. (2001). “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems”, en Haggard. S, y McCubins M. (Eds.). Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, 64-104. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, W. (1945). “Parliamentary Government in Latin America”, American Political Science Review 39(3), pp. 522-536.
Uprimny, R. (2004). “The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in Colombia”, en S. Gloppen, R. Gargarella y Skaar, E. (Eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies. Londres: Frank Cass, pp. 46-69.
Weldon, J. (1997). “Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 2252-58. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Zovatto, Daniel, y Jesus Orozco Henriquez (Eds.) (2008). Reforma Política y Electoral en América Latina, 1978-2007. Ciudad de México: UNAM.
Downloads
Published
2018-05-01
Issue
Section
Articles
How to Cite
The reform of presidentialism in Latin America. Towards a hybrid model. (2018). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 27(1), 131-151. https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.27.6
