La partición de un cartel: votaciones nominales y guerra faccional en la asamblea legislativa del distrito federal
Palabras clave:
Partidos, facciones partidistas, poder de agenda, votaciones nominales, legislaturas subnacionalesResumen
La teoría del cartel procedimental de Cox y McCubbins predice conflicto mínimo o incluso nulo en el seno del partido mayoritario en votaciones plenarias. Esto es consecuencia del control férreo de la agenda legislativa que ejercen miembros clave del partido. El estudio de las votaciones nominales de la IVa Legislatura de la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal (2006-09) descubre escisiones frecuentes del partido mayoritario en la sesión plenaria. La estimación de puntos ideales de los diputados a partir de sus votaciones nominales revela dos líneas de segmentación en la Asamblea. Una contrapone izquierda y derecha clásicas en temas socioeconómicos. La otra se asocia con los nombramientos de las autoridades electorales de la ciudad.Si el PRD de centro-izquierda se mostró unido en la primera dimensión, la presencia de dos facciones enfrentadas es manifiesta en la segunda. El trabajo especula sobre la necesidad de teorizar acerca de instrumentos de control de la agenda de las etapas más tardías del proceso legislativo.
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Referencias
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Bagashka, T., y Clark, J. H. (2014). Electoral incentives and legislative organization. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 14 (3), 297-320.
Bagashka, T. y Clark,J. H. (2016). Electoral rules and legislative particularism: evidence from U.S. State Legislatures”. American Political Science Review, 110(3), 441-56.
Bruhn, K. (1997).Taking on Goliath: The emergence of a new left party and the struggle for democracy in Mexico. Penn State University Press, University Park.
Bruhn, K.(2014). Choosing How to Choose,Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 30(1), 212-40.
Cain, B. E., Ferejohn, J. A., yFiorina, M. P.(1987).The personal vote: constituency service and electoral independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Calvo, E.(2014).Legislator success in fragmented congresses in Argentina: Plurality cartels, minority presidents, and lawmaking. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cantú, F., Desposato, S., yMagar, E.(2014). Consideraciones metodológicas para estudiantes de política legislativa mexicana: sesgo por selección en votaciones nominales,Política y Gobierno, 21(1),25-54.
Clinton, J., Jackman, S., yRivers,D. (2004). Statistical analysis of roll call data,American Political Science Review,98(2), 355-70.
Combes, H.(2004). Élections internes et transition démocratique: le cas du Parti de la Révolution Démocratique au Mexique 1989-2001.Problèmes d’Amérique latine, 54,53-72.
Cooper, J., Brady, D. W., yHurley, P. A.(1977).The electoral basis of party voting: Patterns and trends in the U.S. House of Representatives. EnL.Maisel, y J.Cooper (Eds.), The Impact of the Electoral Process.Beverly Hills:Sage.
Cox, G. W. (2006). The Organization of democratic legislatures. En B. R.Weingast, y D. A.Wittman (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy(pp. 141-61). New York: Oxford University Press.
Cox, G. W., yMcCubbins, M. D.(1993).Legislative Leviathan: party government in the house. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cox, G. W., y McCubbins, M. D.(2005). Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the US House of Representatives. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Crossa, V. (2009). Resisting the entrepreneurial city: street vendors’ struggle in Mexico City’s Historic Center.International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,33(1),43-63.
Desposato, S. W. (2001). Institutional theories, societal realities, and party politics in Brazil,Ph.D. thesis, UCLA.
Desposato, S. W. (2004). The impact of federalism on national party cohesion in Brazil.Legislative Studies Quarterly, 29(2),259-85.
Estévez, F., Magar,E., yRosas, G.(2008).Partisanship in non-partisan electoral agencies and democratic compliance: evidence from Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute.Electoral Studies, 27 (2),257-71.
Estrada, L., yPoiré,A. (2007).Learning to lose, taught to protest: Mexico’s 2006 election.Journal of Democracy,18(1),73-87.
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Jones, M. P., yHwang,W. (2005).Party government in presidential democracies: Ex-tending cartel and CPG theory beyond the U.S. Congress. American Journal of Political Science, 49(2):267-82.
Kerevell, Y. P. (2015). Pork-barreling without reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly,40 (1):137-66.
Krehbiel, K. (1993). Where’s the Party?British Journal of Political Science, 23(2): 235- 66.
Lacalle, M., yMicozzi, J. P.(n.d.).Where’s the party? Examining legislative behavior through roll-call analysis in the city of Buenos Aires Legislature,Unpublished manuscript, ITAM.
López Lara, A. F.(2012). Comparando el mapa espacial de las legislaturas estatales de México,Cadernos da Escola do Legislativo, 13 (21):9-56.
López Lara, A. F.(2013). Ideología y coaliciones en la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal.En L. Béjar Algazi (Ed.), ¿Quién, cómo y qué se legisla en México?(pp. 217-64). Mexico City: UNAM.
Lunn, D., Thomas, A., Best, N., ySpiegelhalter, D.(2000). WinBUGS - a Bayesian modelling framework: concepts, structure, and extensibility.Statistics and Computing, 10:325-37.
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Magar, E., Estévez, F. yRosas,G.(2010).“Partisanship Among the Experts: The Dynamic Party Watchdog Model of IFE, 1996-2010,”Presented at the Electoral Administration in Mexico research workshop, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, La Jolla, CA, Septiembre 23. Recuperado dehttp://ssrn.com/paper=1683498).
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Morgenstern, S., yNacif, B.(2002).Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Niño Melka, M. (2010). Un mapa espacial de la Asamblea del Distrito Federal: disciplina y fraccionalismo legislativos,BA. tesis, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.
Özler, S. I. (2009). Out of the plaza and into the office: social movement leaders in the PRD. Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos,25(1),125-54.
Poole, K. T. (2005).Spatial models of parliamentary voting. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Poole, K. T., y Rosenthal, H.(1985). A spatial model for legislative roll call analysis. American Journal of Political Science,29(2),357-84.
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Rennó, L., yHiroi, T.(2015). Obstrucción y proceso decisorio en la Cámara de los Diputados: Brasil 1991-2010,América Latina Hoy,70,135-63.
Rosas, G., yLangston,J.(2011).Gubernatorial effects in the voting behavior of national legislators.The Journal of Politics, 73 (2),477-93.
Royko, M. (1971).Boss Richard J. Daley of Chicago. New York: Penguin.
Saiegh, S. M. (2011).Ruling by statute: how uncertainty and vote buying shape law-making.New York; Cambridge University Press.
Samuels, D. (2003).Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sánchez, A., Magaloni, B., yMagar, E.(2011).Legalist vs. interpretativist: the Supreme Court and democratic transition in Mexico. En G.Helmke, y J.Ríos Figueroa, (Eds.), Courts in Latin America(pp. 187-218). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz, T. (1987). Votes, strategies, and institutions: an introduction to the theory of collective choice. EnM. D.McCubbins y T.Sullivan (Eds.), Congress: structure and policy (pp. 318-45). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shepsle, K. A. yWeingast, B. R.(1994). Positive theories of congressional institutions. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19(1),149-78.
Squire, P. (1992). Legislative professionalization and membership diversity in state legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly,17 (1),69-79.
Squire, P.(2014).The evolution of American legislatures: colonies, territories, and states, 1619-2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press.
Stecker, C.(2010). Causes of roll-call votes supply: evidence from the German Länder. Journal of Legislative Studies,16(4),438-59.
Tejera, H. (2000). Cultura de la política, campañas electorales y demandas ciudadanas en la Ciudad de México.Perfiles Latinoamericanos 16,53-75.
Weingast, B. R., yMarshall,W. J. (1988). The industrial organization of congress; or why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.Journal of Political Economy, 96(1),132-63.
Weldon, J. A. (2002). Las fuentes políticas del presidencialismo en México. En S.Mainwaring y M. S.Shugart (Eds.), Presidencialismo y democracia en América Latina (pp. 175-211). México DF: Paidós.
Wright, G. C., ySchaffner, B. F.(2002). The influence of party: evidence from the state legislatures. American Political Science Review,96 (2),367-79.
Amorim Neto, O., Cox, G. W. yMcCubbins,M. D.(2003).Agenda power in Brazil’s Câmara dos Deputados, 1989-98.World Politics, 55(4),550-78.
Bagashka, T., y Clark, J. H. (2014). Electoral incentives and legislative organization. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 14 (3), 297-320.
Bagashka, T. y Clark,J. H. (2016). Electoral rules and legislative particularism: evidence from U.S. State Legislatures”. American Political Science Review, 110(3), 441-56.
Bruhn, K. (1997).Taking on Goliath: The emergence of a new left party and the struggle for democracy in Mexico. Penn State University Press, University Park.
Bruhn, K.(2014). Choosing How to Choose,Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 30(1), 212-40.
Cain, B. E., Ferejohn, J. A., yFiorina, M. P.(1987).The personal vote: constituency service and electoral independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Calvo, E.(2014).Legislator success in fragmented congresses in Argentina: Plurality cartels, minority presidents, and lawmaking. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cantú, F., Desposato, S., yMagar, E.(2014). Consideraciones metodológicas para estudiantes de política legislativa mexicana: sesgo por selección en votaciones nominales,Política y Gobierno, 21(1),25-54.
Clinton, J., Jackman, S., yRivers,D. (2004). Statistical analysis of roll call data,American Political Science Review,98(2), 355-70.
Combes, H.(2004). Élections internes et transition démocratique: le cas du Parti de la Révolution Démocratique au Mexique 1989-2001.Problèmes d’Amérique latine, 54,53-72.
Cooper, J., Brady, D. W., yHurley, P. A.(1977).The electoral basis of party voting: Patterns and trends in the U.S. House of Representatives. EnL.Maisel, y J.Cooper (Eds.), The Impact of the Electoral Process.Beverly Hills:Sage.
Cox, G. W. (2006). The Organization of democratic legislatures. En B. R.Weingast, y D. A.Wittman (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy(pp. 141-61). New York: Oxford University Press.
Cox, G. W., yMcCubbins, M. D.(1993).Legislative Leviathan: party government in the house. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cox, G. W., y McCubbins, M. D.(2005). Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the US House of Representatives. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Crossa, V. (2009). Resisting the entrepreneurial city: street vendors’ struggle in Mexico City’s Historic Center.International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,33(1),43-63.
Desposato, S. W. (2001). Institutional theories, societal realities, and party politics in Brazil,Ph.D. thesis, UCLA.
Desposato, S. W. (2004). The impact of federalism on national party cohesion in Brazil.Legislative Studies Quarterly, 29(2),259-85.
Estévez, F., Magar,E., yRosas, G.(2008).Partisanship in non-partisan electoral agencies and democratic compliance: evidence from Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute.Electoral Studies, 27 (2),257-71.
Estrada, L., yPoiré,A. (2007).Learning to lose, taught to protest: Mexico’s 2006 election.Journal of Democracy,18(1),73-87.
Figueiredo, A. C., yLimongi, F.(2001).Executivo e legislativo na nova ordem constitucional.Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV.
Freidenberg, F.(2013). Dedazos, elecciones o encuestas: procesos de selección de candidatos a los diputados mexicanos en perspectiva comparada. EnM. AlcántaraSáez y L.M CabezasRincón(Eds.), Selección de candidatos y elaboración de programas en los partidos políticos latinoamericanos. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc.
González, R. C. (2010). The legislative politics of party competition: an analysis of internal organization in eight Mexican State Congresses, 2001-2008,Ph.D. thesis, Rice.
Hilgers, T.(2008). Causes and consequences of political clientelism: Mexico’s PRD in comparative perspective.Latin American Politics and Society, 50(4): 123-53.
Jenkins, J. A., yMonroe,N. W.(2016).On measuring legislative agenda-setting power. American Journal of Political Science, 59, 1,158-74.
Jones, M. P., yHwang,W. (2005).Party government in presidential democracies: Ex-tending cartel and CPG theory beyond the U.S. Congress. American Journal of Political Science, 49(2):267-82.
Kerevell, Y. P. (2015). Pork-barreling without reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly,40 (1):137-66.
Krehbiel, K. (1993). Where’s the Party?British Journal of Political Science, 23(2): 235- 66.
Lacalle, M., yMicozzi, J. P.(n.d.).Where’s the party? Examining legislative behavior through roll-call analysis in the city of Buenos Aires Legislature,Unpublished manuscript, ITAM.
López Lara, A. F.(2012). Comparando el mapa espacial de las legislaturas estatales de México,Cadernos da Escola do Legislativo, 13 (21):9-56.
López Lara, A. F.(2013). Ideología y coaliciones en la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal.En L. Béjar Algazi (Ed.), ¿Quién, cómo y qué se legisla en México?(pp. 217-64). Mexico City: UNAM.
Lunn, D., Thomas, A., Best, N., ySpiegelhalter, D.(2000). WinBUGS - a Bayesian modelling framework: concepts, structure, and extensibility.Statistics and Computing, 10:325-37.
Magar, E.(2007). The incidence of executive vetoes in comparative perspective: the case of American State Governments, 1979-1999.Recuperado de http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491112.
Magar, E., Estévez, F. yRosas,G.(2010).“Partisanship Among the Experts: The Dynamic Party Watchdog Model of IFE, 1996-2010,”Presented at the Electoral Administration in Mexico research workshop, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, La Jolla, CA, Septiembre 23. Recuperado dehttp://ssrn.com/paper=1683498).
Mayhew, D. R.(1974).Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Meyenberg Leycegui, Y.(2004). El PRD: La pugna por un nuevo liderazgo. EnR. M. Mirón Lince, y R. Espinoza Toledo (Eds.), Partidos políticos en México: nuevos liderazgos y relaciones(pp. 49-68). México DF: UAM y UNAM.
Morgenstern, S., yNacif, B.(2002).Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Niño Melka, M. (2010). Un mapa espacial de la Asamblea del Distrito Federal: disciplina y fraccionalismo legislativos,BA. tesis, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.
Özler, S. I. (2009). Out of the plaza and into the office: social movement leaders in the PRD. Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos,25(1),125-54.
Poole, K. T. (2005).Spatial models of parliamentary voting. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Poole, K. T., y Rosenthal, H.(1985). A spatial model for legislative roll call analysis. American Journal of Political Science,29(2),357-84.
R. Dev. Core Team (2011).R. a language and environment for statistical computing,R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Recuperado de http://www.R-project.org.
Rennó, L., yHiroi, T.(2015). Obstrucción y proceso decisorio en la Cámara de los Diputados: Brasil 1991-2010,América Latina Hoy,70,135-63.
Rosas, G., yLangston,J.(2011).Gubernatorial effects in the voting behavior of national legislators.The Journal of Politics, 73 (2),477-93.
Royko, M. (1971).Boss Richard J. Daley of Chicago. New York: Penguin.
Saiegh, S. M. (2011).Ruling by statute: how uncertainty and vote buying shape law-making.New York; Cambridge University Press.
Samuels, D. (2003).Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sánchez, A., Magaloni, B., yMagar, E.(2011).Legalist vs. interpretativist: the Supreme Court and democratic transition in Mexico. En G.Helmke, y J.Ríos Figueroa, (Eds.), Courts in Latin America(pp. 187-218). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz, T. (1987). Votes, strategies, and institutions: an introduction to the theory of collective choice. EnM. D.McCubbins y T.Sullivan (Eds.), Congress: structure and policy (pp. 318-45). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shepsle, K. A. yWeingast, B. R.(1994). Positive theories of congressional institutions. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19(1),149-78.
Squire, P. (1992). Legislative professionalization and membership diversity in state legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly,17 (1),69-79.
Squire, P.(2014).The evolution of American legislatures: colonies, territories, and states, 1619-2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press.
Stecker, C.(2010). Causes of roll-call votes supply: evidence from the German Länder. Journal of Legislative Studies,16(4),438-59.
Tejera, H. (2000). Cultura de la política, campañas electorales y demandas ciudadanas en la Ciudad de México.Perfiles Latinoamericanos 16,53-75.
Weingast, B. R., yMarshall,W. J. (1988). The industrial organization of congress; or why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.Journal of Political Economy, 96(1),132-63.
Weldon, J. A. (2002). Las fuentes políticas del presidencialismo en México. En S.Mainwaring y M. S.Shugart (Eds.), Presidencialismo y democracia en América Latina (pp. 175-211). México DF: Paidós.
Wright, G. C., ySchaffner, B. F.(2002). The influence of party: evidence from the state legislatures. American Political Science Review,96 (2),367-79.
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2017-06-01
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La partición de un cartel: votaciones nominales y guerra faccional en la asamblea legislativa del distrito federal. (2017). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 26(1), 35-58. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/31
