Modelización de procesos históricos complejos a través de la narrativa analítica
Palabras clave:
Narrativa Analítica, Política Comparada, MetodologíaResumen
El proyecto Narrativas Analíticas representa un esfuerzo por aclarar y hacer explícito el enfoque adoptado por numerosos investigadores que tratan de combinar las investigaciones históricas y comparadas, con los modelos de rational choice. Con el objetivo de comprender las distintas instancias de origen y cambio de las instituciones, los narradores analíticos insisten en la combinación de un profundo conocimiento del caso con un modelo teórico explícito. Estas exigencias, sin embargo, no diferencian en sí mismo a la Narrativa Analítica de otras investigaciones histórico-comparativas bien diseñadas. El objetivo de este artículo es explicar qué es el enfoque narrativo analítico, y qué lo distingue de otros enfoques comprometidos con un riguroso abordaje histórico y comparativo. En el libro original y en las respuestas a sus críticos (Bates et al., 1998; Bates et al., 2000b; Bates et al., 2000a), los autores han tratado de subrayar los elementos cruciales del enfoque, pero aun quedan asuntos por sistematizar.
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Referencias
Bates, Robert H. (1998). “The International Coffee Organization: An International Institution” en Bates, Robert H. et.al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 194–230.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi y Jean-Laurent (1998). Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, y Barry Weingast (2000a). “Analytic Narratives Revisited”, en Social Science History 24, 685–696.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, y Barry Weingast. (2000b). “The Analytic Narrative Project”, en American Political Science Review 94, 696–702. 18
Carpenter, Daniel P. (2000). “What is the Marginal Value of Analytic Narratives?”, en Social Science History 24, 653–668.
Elster, Jon (1998). “A Plea for Mechanisms”, en Hedstrom, Peter y Richard Swedberg (eds.), Social Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 45–73.
Elster, Jon (1999). Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon (2000). “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition”, en American Political Science Review 94, 685–695.
George, Alexander (1989). “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison”, en Lawrence, P.G. Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy. Free Press, New York. 43–68.
George, Alexander y Andrew Bennett (2005). Case Study and Theory Development. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Golden, Miriam (1997). Heroic Defeats: The Politics of Job Loss. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Greif, Avner (1996). “On the Study of Organizations and Evolving Organizational Forms Through History: Reflections from the Late Medieval Firm”, en Industrial and Corporate Change 5, 473–502.
Greif, Avner (1998). “Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa”, en Bates, Robert H. et. al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 23–63.
Hardin, Russell (1999). Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hechter, Michael (1990). “On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action Problems”, en Schweers Cook, Karen y Margaret Levi (eds.), The Limits of Rationality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 240–249.
Hechter, Michael (1992). “The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems” en Rationality & Society 4, 33–40.
Iversen, Torben (1999). Contested Economic Institutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Katznelson, Ira (1997). “Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics” en Mark Lichbach, Mark y Alan Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
King, Gary, Robert Keohane y Sidney Verba (1994). Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Kiser, Edgar (1994). “Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis”, en Politics & Society 22, 285–316.
Kiser, Edgar y Michael Hechter (1991). “The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology, en American Journal of Sociology 97, 1–30.
Kiser, Edgar y Michael Hechter (1998). “The Debate on Historical Sociology”, en American Journal of Sociology. 104, 785–816.
Knight, Jack (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laitin, David D. (1998). Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New Jersey.
Levi, Margaret (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Levi, Margaret (1990). “A Logic of Institutional Change” en Schweers Cook, Karen y Margaret Levi (ed.), The Limits of Rationality. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 402–418.
Levi, Margaret (1998). “The Price of Citizenship: Conscription in France, the United States, and Prussia in the Nineteenth Century” en Bates, Robert H. et al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Mahoney, James (1999). “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis”, en American Journal of Sociology 104, 1154–1196.
Mahoney, James (2000). “Rational Choice Theory and the Comparative Method: An Emerging Synthesis?” en Studies in Comparative International Development 35, 83–94.
Mahoney, James y Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2002) Comparative-Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. .
Moore, Barrington (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Beacon Press, Boston.
Munck, Gerardo L. (2001). “Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns” en World Politics 53, 173–204.
North, Douglass C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. Norton, New York.
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
North, Douglass C. (1996) [1993]. “Economic Performance Through Time” en Alston, Lee J., Thrainn Eggertsson y Douglass C. North (eds.), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 342–355.
North, Douglass C. y Barry R. Weingast (1989). “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England”, en Journal of Economic History 49, 803–832.
Petersen, Roger (1999). “Mechanisms and Structures in Comparisons”, en Bowen, John y Roger Petersen (ed.). Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 61–75.
Petersen, Roger (2001). Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pierson, Paul (2000). “Path Dependency, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics” en American Political Science Review 94, 251–267.
Riker, William (1964). Federalism. Little, Brown, Boston.
Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent (1998). “The Political Economy of Absolutism Reconsidered” en Bates, Robert H. et al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 64–108.
Scharpf, Fritz (1991). Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Scharpf, Friz (1997). Games Real Actors Play. Westview Press, New York.
Skocpol, Theda y Margaret R. Somers (1980). “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosociological Inquiry” en Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, 174–197.
Stinchcombe, Arthur (1991). “On the Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in the Social Science”, en Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21, 367–388.
Thelen, Kathleen (1999). “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, en Annual Review of Political Science 2, 369–404.
Van Evera, Stephen (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Weingast, Barry R. (1995). “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”, en International Political Science Review 11, 1–31.
Weingast, Barry R. (1998). “Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy”, en Bates, Robert H. et al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 148–193.
Weingast, Barry R., Gabriella Montinolo y Yingyi Qian (1995). “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China” en World Politics 48, 50–81.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi y Jean-Laurent (1998). Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, y Barry Weingast (2000a). “Analytic Narratives Revisited”, en Social Science History 24, 685–696.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, y Barry Weingast. (2000b). “The Analytic Narrative Project”, en American Political Science Review 94, 696–702. 18
Carpenter, Daniel P. (2000). “What is the Marginal Value of Analytic Narratives?”, en Social Science History 24, 653–668.
Elster, Jon (1998). “A Plea for Mechanisms”, en Hedstrom, Peter y Richard Swedberg (eds.), Social Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 45–73.
Elster, Jon (1999). Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon (2000). “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition”, en American Political Science Review 94, 685–695.
George, Alexander (1989). “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison”, en Lawrence, P.G. Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy. Free Press, New York. 43–68.
George, Alexander y Andrew Bennett (2005). Case Study and Theory Development. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Golden, Miriam (1997). Heroic Defeats: The Politics of Job Loss. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Greif, Avner (1996). “On the Study of Organizations and Evolving Organizational Forms Through History: Reflections from the Late Medieval Firm”, en Industrial and Corporate Change 5, 473–502.
Greif, Avner (1998). “Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa”, en Bates, Robert H. et. al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 23–63.
Hardin, Russell (1999). Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hechter, Michael (1990). “On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action Problems”, en Schweers Cook, Karen y Margaret Levi (eds.), The Limits of Rationality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 240–249.
Hechter, Michael (1992). “The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems” en Rationality & Society 4, 33–40.
Iversen, Torben (1999). Contested Economic Institutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Katznelson, Ira (1997). “Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics” en Mark Lichbach, Mark y Alan Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
King, Gary, Robert Keohane y Sidney Verba (1994). Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Kiser, Edgar (1994). “Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis”, en Politics & Society 22, 285–316.
Kiser, Edgar y Michael Hechter (1991). “The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology, en American Journal of Sociology 97, 1–30.
Kiser, Edgar y Michael Hechter (1998). “The Debate on Historical Sociology”, en American Journal of Sociology. 104, 785–816.
Knight, Jack (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laitin, David D. (1998). Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New Jersey.
Levi, Margaret (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Levi, Margaret (1990). “A Logic of Institutional Change” en Schweers Cook, Karen y Margaret Levi (ed.), The Limits of Rationality. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 402–418.
Levi, Margaret (1998). “The Price of Citizenship: Conscription in France, the United States, and Prussia in the Nineteenth Century” en Bates, Robert H. et al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Mahoney, James (1999). “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis”, en American Journal of Sociology 104, 1154–1196.
Mahoney, James (2000). “Rational Choice Theory and the Comparative Method: An Emerging Synthesis?” en Studies in Comparative International Development 35, 83–94.
Mahoney, James y Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2002) Comparative-Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. .
Moore, Barrington (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Beacon Press, Boston.
Munck, Gerardo L. (2001). “Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns” en World Politics 53, 173–204.
North, Douglass C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. Norton, New York.
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
North, Douglass C. (1996) [1993]. “Economic Performance Through Time” en Alston, Lee J., Thrainn Eggertsson y Douglass C. North (eds.), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 342–355.
North, Douglass C. y Barry R. Weingast (1989). “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England”, en Journal of Economic History 49, 803–832.
Petersen, Roger (1999). “Mechanisms and Structures in Comparisons”, en Bowen, John y Roger Petersen (ed.). Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 61–75.
Petersen, Roger (2001). Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pierson, Paul (2000). “Path Dependency, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics” en American Political Science Review 94, 251–267.
Riker, William (1964). Federalism. Little, Brown, Boston.
Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent (1998). “The Political Economy of Absolutism Reconsidered” en Bates, Robert H. et al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 64–108.
Scharpf, Fritz (1991). Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Scharpf, Friz (1997). Games Real Actors Play. Westview Press, New York.
Skocpol, Theda y Margaret R. Somers (1980). “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosociological Inquiry” en Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, 174–197.
Stinchcombe, Arthur (1991). “On the Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in the Social Science”, en Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21, 367–388.
Thelen, Kathleen (1999). “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, en Annual Review of Political Science 2, 369–404.
Van Evera, Stephen (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Weingast, Barry R. (1995). “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”, en International Political Science Review 11, 1–31.
Weingast, Barry R. (1998). “Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy”, en Bates, Robert H. et al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 148–193.
Weingast, Barry R., Gabriella Montinolo y Yingyi Qian (1995). “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China” en World Politics 48, 50–81.
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2018-10-30
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Modelización de procesos históricos complejos a través de la narrativa analítica. (2018). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 15(1), 11-29. https://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/248
