La reforma del presidencialismo en América Latina hacia un modelo híbrido
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.27.6Palabras clave:
poder presidencial, separación de poderes, reforma constitucional, América LatinaResumen
Este artículo analiza los cambios constitucionales que han alterado el poder de los presidentes en América Latina entre 1978 y 2014. Se argumenta que las tendencias de reforma en esta materia se han movido en direcciones opuestas. Se han incorporado reglas que reducen la probabilidad de que el presidente cuente con un apoyo mayoritario en el Congreso, con otras que incrementan su poder de negociar con los legisladores. Por otra parte, mientras muchas reformas se orientan a fortalecer la capacidad del Congreso para supervisar las facultades de gobierno del Ejecutivo, se adoptaron otras que concentran Poder Legislativo en manos del presidente. En este diseño híbrido, las reformas adoptadas coexisten en tensión y tienen un impacto contradictorio en el poder real de los presidentes, de modo tal que es tan incorrecto hablar de un avance del hiperpresidencialismo como de una disminución sistemática del poder de los presidentes en todas sus dimensiones.
Descargas
Los datos de descarga aún no están disponibles.
Referencias
Amorim Neto, O. (2002). “Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil”, en Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Archer, R. y Shugart, M. (1997). “The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 110-159. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, John (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Carey, John y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1998). Executive Decree Authority. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Cárdenas, Mauricio, Roberto Junguito , y Mónica Pachón (2006). Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution. Research Network Working Paper # R-508. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Cox, G. y Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Epilogue: Latin America´s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif (Eds.) Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, José Antonio. (2007). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z. y Ginsburg, T. (2012). “Still the Land of Presidentialism? Executives and the Latin American Constitution”, en D. Nolte y A. Schilling-Vacaflor (Eds.), New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices. Farham: Ashgate.
Crisp, B. (1998). “Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela”, en C. John y M. Shugart (Eds.), Executive Decree Authority. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Gargarella, Roberto (2013). Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press.
Grindle, Merilee (2000). Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Helmke, G. (2005). “Enduring Uncertainty: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina During the 1990s and Beyond”, en S. Levitsky y M. V. Murillo (Eds.), The Politics of Institutional Weakness. Argentine Democracy, 139-162. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Helmke, G. y Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2011). “Introduction: Courts in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 1-26. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1997). Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Mayhew, D. (2008). “Incumbency Advantage in US Presidential Elections: The Historical Record”, Political Science Quarterly, 123 (2), pp. 201-228.
Montero, Alfred P. y David J. Samuels (Eds.) (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Towards a Model of Latin American Legislatures”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif, (Eds.) , Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Negretto, G. y Aguilar-Rivera, J. A. (2000). “Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina (18531-912) and Mexico (18571-910)”, Journal of Latin American Studies 32, pp. 361-397.
Negretto, Gabriel (2013a). Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
(2013) “El Papel de la Constitución en la Nueva Democracia Argentina”, Revista de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, 7 (2), Diciembre.
(2011). “Shifting Constitutional Designs in Latin America: A Two-Level Explanation”, Texas Law Review, 89 (7), pp. 1777-1806.
(2009a). “Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America”, British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 39, pp. 117-139.
(2009b). “La Reforma Electoral en América Latina. Entre el Interés Partidario y las Demandas Ciudadanas”, en A. Fontaine, C. Larroulet, J. Navarrete e I. Walter (Eds.), Reforma del Sistema Electora Chileno, pp. 63-103. Santiago de Chile: PNUD.
(2007). “Propuesta para una reforma electoral en México”, Política y Gobierno XIV(1), pp. 200-215.
(2006). “Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America”, The Journal of Politics, 68 (2) Mayo, pp. 421-433.
(2004). “Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, pp. 531-62.
(2003). “Diseño Constitucional y Separación de Poderes en América Latina”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 65 (1), pp. 41-76.
Nino, C. (1992). “Ideas and Attempts at Reforming the Presidentialist System of Government in Latin America”, en A. Lijphart (Ed.), Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, pp. 128-132. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press .
O´Donnell, G. (1994). “Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 5 (1), pp. 55-69.
O’Neill, Kathleen (2005). Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Rios-Figueroa, J. (2007). “Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002”, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 31-57.
(2011). “Institutions for Constitutional Justice in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 27-54. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Saiegh, S. (2015). “Executive-Legislative Relations”, en Jennifer Ghandi y Ruben Ruiz-Rufino (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. NuevaYork: Routledge.
Sarabia Better, Arturo (2003). Reformas políticas en Colombia: del plebiscito de 1957 al referendo de 2003. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
Serrafero, Mario (2005). Exceptocracia: ¿Confín de la Democracia? Intervención Federal, Estado de Sitio y Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia. Buenos Aires: Editorial Lumiere.
Shugart, M. (1995). “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government”, American Political Science Review 89(2), pp. 327-343.
(1998). “The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices”, British Journal of Political Science 28(1), pp. 1-29.
Shugart, M. y Carey, J. (1992). President and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, M. y Carey. J (1995). “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14(4), pp. 417-439.
Shugart, M. y Haggard, S. (2001). “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems”, en Haggard. S, y McCubins M. (Eds.). Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, 64-104. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, W. (1945). “Parliamentary Government in Latin America”, American Political Science Review 39(3), pp. 522-536.
Uprimny, R. (2004). “The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in Colombia”, en S. Gloppen, R. Gargarella y Skaar, E. (Eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies. Londres: Frank Cass, pp. 46-69.
Weldon, J. (1997). “Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 2252-58. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Zovatto, Daniel, y Jesus Orozco Henriquez (Eds.) (2008). Reforma Política y Electoral en América Latina, 1978-2007. Ciudad de México: UNAM.
Archer, R. y Shugart, M. (1997). “The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 110-159. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, John (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Carey, John y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1998). Executive Decree Authority. New York: Cambridge University Press .
Cárdenas, Mauricio, Roberto Junguito , y Mónica Pachón (2006). Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution. Research Network Working Paper # R-508. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Cox, G. y Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Epilogue: Latin America´s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif (Eds.) Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, José Antonio. (2007). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z. y Ginsburg, T. (2012). “Still the Land of Presidentialism? Executives and the Latin American Constitution”, en D. Nolte y A. Schilling-Vacaflor (Eds.), New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices. Farham: Ashgate.
Crisp, B. (1998). “Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela”, en C. John y M. Shugart (Eds.), Executive Decree Authority. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Gargarella, Roberto (2013). Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press.
Grindle, Merilee (2000). Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Helmke, G. (2005). “Enduring Uncertainty: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina During the 1990s and Beyond”, en S. Levitsky y M. V. Murillo (Eds.), The Politics of Institutional Weakness. Argentine Democracy, 139-162. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Helmke, G. y Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2011). “Introduction: Courts in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 1-26. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott y Matthew Shugart (Eds.) (1997). Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Mayhew, D. (2008). “Incumbency Advantage in US Presidential Elections: The Historical Record”, Political Science Quarterly, 123 (2), pp. 201-228.
Montero, Alfred P. y David J. Samuels (Eds.) (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Morgenstern, S. (2002). “Towards a Model of Latin American Legislatures”, en S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif, (Eds.) , Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 446-468. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Negretto, G. y Aguilar-Rivera, J. A. (2000). “Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina (18531-912) and Mexico (18571-910)”, Journal of Latin American Studies 32, pp. 361-397.
Negretto, Gabriel (2013a). Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
(2013) “El Papel de la Constitución en la Nueva Democracia Argentina”, Revista de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, 7 (2), Diciembre.
(2011). “Shifting Constitutional Designs in Latin America: A Two-Level Explanation”, Texas Law Review, 89 (7), pp. 1777-1806.
(2009a). “Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America”, British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 39, pp. 117-139.
(2009b). “La Reforma Electoral en América Latina. Entre el Interés Partidario y las Demandas Ciudadanas”, en A. Fontaine, C. Larroulet, J. Navarrete e I. Walter (Eds.), Reforma del Sistema Electora Chileno, pp. 63-103. Santiago de Chile: PNUD.
(2007). “Propuesta para una reforma electoral en México”, Política y Gobierno XIV(1), pp. 200-215.
(2006). “Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America”, The Journal of Politics, 68 (2) Mayo, pp. 421-433.
(2004). “Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, pp. 531-62.
(2003). “Diseño Constitucional y Separación de Poderes en América Latina”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 65 (1), pp. 41-76.
Nino, C. (1992). “Ideas and Attempts at Reforming the Presidentialist System of Government in Latin America”, en A. Lijphart (Ed.), Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, pp. 128-132. NuevaYork: Oxford University Press .
O´Donnell, G. (1994). “Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 5 (1), pp. 55-69.
O’Neill, Kathleen (2005). Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Rios-Figueroa, J. (2007). “Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002”, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 31-57.
(2011). “Institutions for Constitutional Justice in Latin America”, en G. Helmke y J. Rios-Figueroa (Eds.), Courts in Latin America, pp. 27-54. NuevaYork: Cambridge University Press .
Saiegh, S. (2015). “Executive-Legislative Relations”, en Jennifer Ghandi y Ruben Ruiz-Rufino (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. NuevaYork: Routledge.
Sarabia Better, Arturo (2003). Reformas políticas en Colombia: del plebiscito de 1957 al referendo de 2003. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
Serrafero, Mario (2005). Exceptocracia: ¿Confín de la Democracia? Intervención Federal, Estado de Sitio y Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia. Buenos Aires: Editorial Lumiere.
Shugart, M. (1995). “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government”, American Political Science Review 89(2), pp. 327-343.
(1998). “The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices”, British Journal of Political Science 28(1), pp. 1-29.
Shugart, M. y Carey, J. (1992). President and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, M. y Carey. J (1995). “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14(4), pp. 417-439.
Shugart, M. y Haggard, S. (2001). “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems”, en Haggard. S, y McCubins M. (Eds.). Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, 64-104. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, W. (1945). “Parliamentary Government in Latin America”, American Political Science Review 39(3), pp. 522-536.
Uprimny, R. (2004). “The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in Colombia”, en S. Gloppen, R. Gargarella y Skaar, E. (Eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies. Londres: Frank Cass, pp. 46-69.
Weldon, J. (1997). “Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico”, en S. Mainwaring y M. Shugart (Eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 2252-58. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Zovatto, Daniel, y Jesus Orozco Henriquez (Eds.) (2008). Reforma Política y Electoral en América Latina, 1978-2007. Ciudad de México: UNAM.
Descargas
Publicado
2018-05-01
Número
Sección
Artículos
Cómo citar
La reforma del presidencialismo en América Latina hacia un modelo híbrido. (2018). Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 27(1), 131-151. https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.27.6
