Estudiando las instituciones

algunas lecciones del enfoque de la elección racional

  • Kenneth A. Shepsle Universidad de Harvard
Palabras clave: Instituciones, elección racional, economía política, teoría política formal, estructura

Resumen

Este artículo examina los desarrollos recientes en la literatura referida como "neo-institucionalismo". Luego de revisar algunas de las consecuencias para el estudio de las instituciones producidas por la revolución conductista y las teorías sobre la elección social influenciadas por Kenneth Arrow, el autor desarrolla la teoría del equilibrio estructuralmente inducido y explora las dos caras de la moneda institucional, esto es, una explicación del desarrollo de la estructura institucional y un examen de sus consecuencias.

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Publicado
2018-10-29
Cómo citar
Shepsle, K. (2018). Estudiando las instituciones. Revista Uruguaya De Ciencia Política, 16(1), 15-34. Recuperado a partir de http://rucp.cienciassociales.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/article/view/232